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Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions
of Brick
Sharon Reece*
Laws grind the poor, and rich men rule the law. - Oliver Goldsmith
INTRODUCTION
A large corporation exposes itself to investigation into its finan-
cial irregularities, it finally goes bankrupt and fires most of its
employees. During the chaos, hundreds of workers lose their re-
tirement benefits and are left to seek government assistance.
Although it seems like another Wall Street Journal news report
about Enron, it is actually a completely separate incident. In De-
cember 1963, the Studebaker Corporation announced it was clos-
ing its South Bend, Indiana plant.' When Studebaker had its
meltdown, almost 10,000 workers lost their jobs and almost 4,000
of those who were vested in their pensions, lost 85 percent of their
pension benefits when their plan was terminated.! Studebaker
was pre-ERISA and ERISA was supposed to guard against such
tragedy from ever striking Americans again.' In fact, as Senator
Jacob Javits stated just before ERISA passed Congress: "[T]his
legislation will make better pension plans and undeniably, better
pension plans will make a significant contribution to the economic
* The author, received her J.D. from Hofstra University School of Law and her
L.L.M. in Taxation from York University School of Law. She subsequently taught at the
Albany Law School and Rutgers University School of Law, Camden, for many years. She is
currently a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the William H. Bowen School of Law of
the University of Arkansas in Little Rock. Professor Reece would like to thank her re-
search assistant, Christy Schmidt, for her excellent research and editing.
1. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 69-
70 (2d ed. 1995) (citing U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 23, 1963, at 76).
2. See Private Pension Plans: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the
Joint Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1966); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 1,
at 54.
3. For a history of pre-ERISA benefit plans see G. Waldron Snyder, Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219 (1975); Stuart N. Alperin
et al., Note, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems,
26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539 (1975).
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security of a large number of older people who need a much more
realistic level of living in retirement."4
Yet, Americans continue to have trouble keeping retirement
amounts secure. One may sympathize with the Enron employees,
mourn loss in one's own portfolio or grumble about the increased
tax burden to cover government employees' pension losses, but one
must not consider the Enron tragedy as an enigma for journalists
to spotlight.5 Other companies' employees have experienced,' or
are at risk to experience7 exactly the same catastrophe, potentially
creating a huge baby-boomer population unable to retire or left to
rely on public assistance, social programs or support from rela-
tives.
Statistics demonstrate retirees depend upon private pensions
and savings,8 often over Social Security.9 The assets at risk are
significant - an estimated $4.0 trillion is held in private pension
plans with 100 or more participants. ° According to the most re-
cent information, "Half of all private sector workers have no re-
tirement plan other than Social Security, and of the 51 million
4. 120 CONG. REC. 29, 243 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits).
5. See discussion infra Part B.
6. See infra notes 300-308 and accompanying text. Companies experiencing similar
or related Enron-type incidents: Color Tile, Inc.; Global Crossing; Polaroid; Lucent; IKON
Office Solutions; Sunbeam; Cendant; Waste Management; Xerox; Equity Funding; and
Morrison Knudson.
7. See infra Appendix 4 and note 267 for a list of companies who, like Enron, have a
high percentage of 401(k) assets in their own stock. Like Enron, these pensions are not
diversified along non-systemic risk.
8. Pension and retirement plans account for 20% with income from other assets
another 20%. Social Security is the largest source of income at 40%. Eighteen percent of
post-retirement income is actually derived from part-time earnings. See EBRI, Retirement
Income Research: 2001 Findings, http://www.ebri.org/ret-findings.htm. According to the
Social Security Administration, quoting the March 2000 Income Supplement, Current
Population Survey of the U.S. Census Bureau, sources of income for the aged in 1999, in
order of reliance are: Social Security (90%); asset income (62%); retirement benefits other
than Social Security, including pensions, annuities, government pensions, Railroad Retire-
ment, IRAs, Keoghs and 401(k) payments (43%); earnings (22%); public assistance (5%) and
veteran's benefits (5%). See http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/Supplement/2000/oasdi.pdf.
9. Social Security is insufficient to maintain wealthier standards of living where it
replaces only 25% of former earnings. Available at
http://www.concordcoalition.org/entitlements/crs050198.html#benefit. As of 1998, social security
provides only 71% of the minimum wage earners final year's earnings, while only providing
for 42% of the average wage earners and only 25% of the maximum wage earner. Id.
10. Especially considering smaller plans are not considered in that total. See Balance
Sheet of Pension Plans by Type of Plan, 1998, available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/programs/opr/updatel998/highlights.htm.
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workers with plans, 19 million, or roughly 37 percent, have
401(k)s as their only plan.""
One might ask, why are our retirement savings at risk when
they are so vital to a stable and financially secure retirement
population? Why has ERISA not protected those benefits as prom-
ised? In an environment of severe risk, uncertainty, obvious past
devastation and warning signals from other companies, why has
no corrective legislation found its way into the books?
To understand the weaknesses in the pension system, Enron
provides the capstone from which to view those gaps and lapses.
Section I of this article introduces the current pension system and
its pertinent intricacies. Section II examines the grotesque sim-
plicity of Enron's collapse beneath what the media portrayed to be
a complex accounting mess and details Enron's retirement plans
to highlight the specific failures of it in the crisis. Section III ex-
plains the actual and potential employee litigation against Enron
and demonstrates the significant gaps in the rights and remedies
which are available through the limited state and federal avenues.
Section IV highlights the warning signals from previous cases and
questions how legislators and courts could let these gaps remain
to allow Enron employees to suffer the same injustices. Section V
discusses pending Congressional legislation offered to close those
gaps and investigates the proponents and critics of each approach.
Finally section VI offers a conclusion to what is and will continue
to be a social concern vital to address.
I. THE PRIVATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM
A. ERISA
As discussed in the introduction, Congress passed the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, or "ERISA,"2 to prevent,
inter alia, Studebaker-like incidences. Prior to Congressional
regulation of the private pension system, many retirees' hopes
were frustrated since employers designed plans as conditional
11. Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Hearing on
H.R. 3488 and H.R. 1656 Before the Subcomm. On Oversight, House Comm. On Ways and
Means, 2002 WL 20318368 (statement of Karen D. Friedman, Director of Policy Strategies,
Pension Rights Center).
12. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). ERISA
also had the purpose of legislating uniformity between the states. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§1001
for purposes of ERISA and jurisdiction under the commerce clause.
Fall 2002
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gifts13 and could deny even vested benefits. Additionally, company
abuses of plan assets and failure to protect funds added to the
probability that retirees would need to seek governmental assis-
tance in old age. After the Studebaker crisis, Congress specifically
intended ERISA to protect the employee's promised benefit and
deter any abuse of plan assets.
14
ERISA protects plans through a combination of prohibitions,
disclosures, and fiduciary responsibilities aimed at providing secu-
rity for employees and recourse in the event the employer or other
fiduciary violates the rules. The statute provides a series of rules
for the employer regarding vesting, 5 participation, 16 funding, 7 dis-
closure,18 fiduciary responsibilities 9 and remedial provisions.2 °
13. Employers would revoke even vested benefits by defining plans as "voluntary
gifts." This "gratuity theory of pensions" is now disregarded and pensions are viewed under
the deferred wage theory. See WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH AND FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS
AND PUBLIC POLICY, 27-47 (1976). See also McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y. S. 98
(1898) (pension unenforceable as promise of a future gift.).
14. The purposes behind ERISA appear in §1001 of the act:
The continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
are directly affected by these plans; ... [which] have become an important factor af-
fecting the stability of employment and the successful development of industrial rela-
tions; . . . and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for
the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equita-
ble character of such plans and their financial soundness. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. §
1001(a). Requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants -and beneficiaries of
financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and
by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts. ERISA §2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). Improving the equitable character and the
soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees
with significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of funding, and by re-
quiring plan termination insurance.
ERISA § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
15. ERISA §203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat.
127 (2001) (employees must vest after a certain specified minimum period of employment).
16. ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994) (participation in the plan cannot be unduly
delayed).
17. ERISA §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085(a) (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (adequate
funding).
18. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (participants
must know their rights and obligations).
19. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994 & Supp. V 2000). Under §1102,
a "named fiduciary" is an employer or employee organization who, under §1104 are re-
quired to manage funds for the benefit of the employees. This includes diversifying and
investing the funds in a prudent, reasonable manner. Id.
20. ERISA §§ 501-511, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1141 (1994 & Supp. V 2000). For example,
§1131 proscribes criminal penalties for failure to administer the plan properly; §1132 pro-
vides the basis and standing for civil actions with §1133 providing means whereby an em-
ployee can receive review of claim denials. The Secretary is provided with investigatory
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In concert with ERISA and in order to induce the establishment
and participation in such plans,"' Congress amended the Internal
Revenue Code ("IRC") to provide for tax deferral to the employee
for contributions to qualifying plans. In fact, ERISA defines a
"qualified plan" as one that receives certain tax benefits as a re-
sult of adhering to IRC §§401-416.22 Although the IRC overlaps
with ERISA in many areas, 3 it also has a number of its own spe-
cial protections. 4 ERISA's main contribution is in its fiduciary
package comprised of disclosure requirements,25 fiduciary re-
quirements and enforcement provisions. 26  The IRC also provides
for similar fiduciary duties. 7
These fiduciary provisions play an important role in protecting
employees and ERISA provides a very broad function-sensitive
definition of a fiduciary. Under ERISA,
anyone who exercises discretionary control or authority over
plan management or plan assets with discretionary authority
or responsibility for the administration of a plan, or anyone
who provides investment advice to a plan for compensation or
has any authority or responsibility to do so.. .including plan
trustees, plan administrators, and members of a plan's in-
powers and procedures under §1134 and the right to expand the law through regulation
under §1135. Id.
21. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, S. REP. NO. 93-127 at 4-5
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4898-99, 4960.
22. I.R.C. §§ 401-416 (2001). I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) incorporates Internal Revenue Code
provisions into ERISA.
23. For example, I.R.C. § 401 provides restrictions on alienation, for example, allowing
only 10% alienation once in payment, Section 728 restricts loans against the plan funds.
Section 410(a) provides standards for minimum participation; Section 411 provides mini-
mum vesting standards; and Section 412 (1994) requires adequate funding. I.R.C. §§ 401,
410-412, 728 (2001).
24. Special rules relating only to tax qualified plans include, for example, I.R.C. §§
401, 410 and 414 provide non-discrimination requirements allowing a plan to be deemed
qualified only if the plan does not discriminate between highly paid and other employees.
Sections 401 and 415 provide for limits on contributions. Section 401 provides distribution
and contribution, including matching, requirements. Sections 410(b) & 401(a)(3) &
401(a)(4) provide rules relating to minimum coverage and nondiscrimination rules. Section
411(d)(3) provides rules relating to full vesting upon termination. I.R.C. §§ 401, 410-411,
414-415 (2001),
25. ERISA § 101 - 111.
26. ERISA §§ 404, 500.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5) and Rev. Rul. 69-494, imposes fiduciary duties regard-
ing the investment of plan assets which must be properly made if the plan is to remain
qualified. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5) (2001).
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vestment committee is a fiduciary. This deterition creates the
possibility that a plan may have many fiduciaries.28
In contrast, consider under trust law the narrow boundaries of a
"fiduciary" as a "trustee" who "holds trust property. Trust law
definition of a fiduciary was too confining for the purposes of
ERISA."
259
28. ERISA §3 (21) Department of Labor, Protecting Your Plan Assets, available at
http://www.dol.gov/pwba/pubs/youknow/know8.htm. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(1994 & Supp. V 2000):
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any dis-
cretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets,
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or re-
sponsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary re-
sponsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term includes any person desig-
nated under section 1105(c)(1)(B) of this title.
Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 2000):
Allocation of fiduciary responsibility; designated persons to carry out fiduciary re-
sponsibilities (1) The instrument under which a plan is maintained may expressly
provide for procedures (A) for allocating fiduciary responsibilities (other than trustee
responsibilities) among named fiduciaries, and (B) for named fiduciaries to designate
persons other than named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities (other
than trustee responsibilities) under the plan.
Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1994 & Supp. V 2000):
(1) Every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a
written instrument. Such instrument shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries
who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and
administration of the plan. (2) For purposes of this subchapter, the term "named fi-
duciary" means a fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant to
a procedure specified in the plan, is identified as a fiduciary (A) by a person who is an
employer or employee organization with respect to the plan or (B) by such an em-
ployer and such an employee organization acting jointly.
Id.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 cmt. c (1996). Under the Restatement Third of
Trusts, a "trust" is the fiduciary relationship "with respect to property, arising as a result of
a manifestation of an intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who
holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or
more persons . . ." Id. § 2. The fiduciary relationship to another, under trust law, occurs
"where the trustee is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within
the scope of the relationship." Id. § 2, cmt. b. This parallel is explained in Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996):
"In doing so, we recognize that these fiduciary duties draw much of their content
from the common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans before ER-
ISA's enactment." (citing Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985))."[R]ather than explicitly
enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress
invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and
responsibility."; H.R. REP. No. 93-533, pp. 3-5, 11-13 (1973), 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (Committee Print compiled for
the Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by
the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-406, pp. 2350-52, 2358-60 (1976) [hereinafter
Fall 2002 Enron: Final Straw and Pensions of Brick 75
ERISA holds fiduciaries to the prudent person standard3" and
requires diversification of investment as part of that standard."
Specifically, ERISA generally imposes on fiduciaries the duties of
loyalty,32 prudence,33 and prudent diversification of plan assets.34
Failure to invest prudently or diversify the plan's investments
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, for which the
fiduciary may be held personally liable. 5 Employee control of the
investments does not divest fiduciaries of their responsibility over
the account, but does divest responsibility for those specific
choices the employee makes. 6 Fiduciaries found liable for breach
LEG. HIST.]; GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 255,
at 343 (rev. 2d ed.1992).
"We also recognize, however, that trust law does not tell the entire story. After all,
ERISA's standards and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determi-
nation that the common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection."
See ERISA § 2(a). See also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra, at 3-5, 11-13; 2 LEG. HIST.
2350-52; 2358-60; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280, pp. 295, 302 (1974); 3 LEG. HIST. 4562,
4569. Even with respect to the trust-like fiduciary standards ERISA imposes, Con-
gress "expect[ed] that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other
fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee
benefit plans," Id. at 302, 3 LEG. HiST. 4569, as they "develop a 'federal common law of
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.' " Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56
(1987))."
Id.
30. See 29 U.S.C. §1104 for fiduciary duties:
A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and--(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable ex-
penses of administering the plan; (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence un-
der the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims; (C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so; ... (2) In the case of an eligible individual account plan (as defined in
section 1107(d)(3) of this title), the diversification requirement of paragraph (1)(C)
and the prudence requirement (only to the extent that it requires diversification) of
paragraph (1)(B) is not violated by acquisition or holding of qualifying employer real




32. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
33. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
34. Id.§ 1104(a)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 2000). For discussion of the impositions see
Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 469,
476 (2001).
35. John L. Utz, Salary Reduction Plans and 404(c) Limits on Fiduciary Responsibil-
ity, N98 EBAB ABA-L GLED F-i, Part 2 § 1 (1998).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994 & Supp. v 2000), which provides in pertinent part:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and permits a
participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his account, if a par-
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can be subjected to numerous penalties including, but not limited
to, payment of damages out of their own pensions to make the
plan whole. 7
B. Retirement Plans Explained38
ERISA's articulated intention was to protect "employee pension
benefit plans," 9 which includes both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans.4" The private pension system is divided gener-
ticipant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined
under regulations of the Secretary)-- (A) such participant or beneficiary shall not be
deemed to be a fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and (B) no person who is other-
wise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part for any loss, or by reason of any
breach, which results from such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
Id. But see infra notes 102-112 regarding 401(k).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994 & Supp. v 2000), which provides in pertinent part:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the respon-
sibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each
such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including re-
moval of such fiduciary. A fiduciary may also be removed for a violation of section
1111 of this title.
Id.
ERISA § 206(d) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) permits punishment by invading a fiduciary retire-
ment benefit if the participant is convicted of a crime involving the plan. ERISA § 206(d);
I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (2001).
38. For definitions, see the Department of Labor's website, available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm.
39. ERISA defines "employee pension benefit plans" as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hearafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or
program -(i) provided retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of
income by employees for periods extencding to the termination of covered employ-
ment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating contributions made to the
plan, the method of calculating benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
29 U.S.C. §1002(2) (1994 & Supp. v 2000).
40. http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm. ERISA defines each
under 29 U.S.C. § 1002:
(34) The term "individual account plan" or "defined contribution plan" means a pen-
sion plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for bene-
fits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account, and any
income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other partici-
pants which may be allocated to such participant's account. (35) The term "defined
benefit plan" means a pension plan other than an individual account plan; except
that a pension plan which is not an individual account plan and which provides a
benefit derived from employer contributions which is based partly on the balance of
the separate account of a participant.
29 U. S. C. § 1002 (34)-(35) (1994 & Supp. v 2000). See also infra notes 40-64 and accompa-
nying text for a complete discussion of each type of plan.
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ally along these two types of plans. Although many subtypes and
hybrids exist along and between those two types,4' understanding
the essential differences between the general categories provides
clarification for the more complex varieties.
1. Defined Benefit Plans
A defined benefit plan4 promises a specified periodic payment at
retirement, either as an exact dollar amount or as a calculated
benefit through a service and salary formula.4 '  The employer's
contribution to the plan is actuarially calculated based on the spe-
cific benefit promised to the employee. Employees can add to the
pool for their benefit." Employers maintain the "general pool of
pension assets rather than individual accounts" 5 and the em-
ployer is the primary guarantor of the benefits. In the event the
pension plan becomes underfunded, or for any reason the em-
ployer does not or cannot pay the promised benefit, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"),46 pays minimum pension
benefits.4 ' ERISA created PBGC "to guarantee private defined
benefit pension plans that terminate without sufficient assets."4
41. There are many types of retirement plans, including: profit sharing, 401(k), Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), 403(b) Annuities, 457 plans, Simplified Employee
Pension Plans (IRAs, individual retirement accounts or SEPs), SIMPLEs, ROTH IRAs,
Money Purchase Plans, Profit Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans. For example, An SEP is a
simplified retirement account for small employers, with 25 or fewer employees, where an
employee sets up an IRA to accept pre-tax dollars and employer matching funds.
http://www.dol.gov/pwba/pubs/youknow/knowl.htm#defined.
42. Also known as "final average pay" or "career average pay" plans. See Douglas E.
Motzenbecker, Recent Case Law Developments Affecting Cash Balance Pension Plans, 17
LAB. LAW. 285, 287 (2001).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii)(2001); see also
http://www.dol.gov/dolltopicretirement/types of plans.htm.
44. Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Hearing Before
the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 2002 WL 20318369 (statement of Ron
Gebhardtsbauer, Senior Pension Fellow, American Academy of Actuaries). Employees
rarely contribute after-tax dollars.
45. Motzenbecker, supra note 42, at 286.
46. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation available at http://www.pbgc.gov.
47. Id. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC") also has recourse against
the employer and its affiliates. PBGC pays terminated plan benefits up to a statutorily
proscribed amount, seeking the remainder through action against the employer and the
affiliates. Financing for PBGC comes "mainly from insurance premiums paid by companies
whose plans [are] protect[ed], not from taxes." See PBGC website at http://www.pbgc.gov.
48. Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation before the Senate Committee on Finance (February 27, 2002), available at
http://www.pbgc.gov/news/speeches/test 02_27_2002.htm. ("PBGC is one of the three so-
called "ERISA agencies" with jurisdiction over private pension plans. The other two agen-
cies are the Department of the Treasury (including the Internal Revenue Service) and the
Department of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA).").
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Defined benefit plans require a guarantee of benefits irrespective
of the plan investment performance 49 and PBGC acts as guarantor
of benefits in underfunded plans that terminate. PBGC repre-
sents employee advantages to a defined benefit plan including
knowing one's future retirement benefit amount and knowing that
the benefit is PBGC-insured. ° According to PBGC, employers
benefit from offering defined benefit plans as well, since these
types of plans "promote and retain worker loyalty."' However, the
PBGC does not provide cover for the employer, who remains liable
to the PBGC for any amounts the PBGC pays employees.
2. Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans provide individual retirement ac-
counts for employees and include 401(k) plans,52 profit-sharing
plans, 3 stock bonus plans, employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs),"5 money purchase pension plans" and 403b type plans.
Employee, employer, or sometimes both (as in a matching agree-
ment), contribute pre-tax dollars to the employee's individual ac-
count under the plan (sometimes at a set rate) and the account is
invested for the employee.57 At retirement, the defined contribu-
tion plan employee receives the value of these accounts, which of
course fluctuate with contributions, forfeitures and investment
gains and losses. The employee remains at full risk with this type
of plan.
Since defined benefit plan retirement payouts are determined
through calculations of years of service and long-term employ-
ment, the defined contribution plan is more attractive to the
younger, more mobile employee who appreciates its portability."
49. Motzenbecker, supra note 42, at 286.
50. http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/dbbenfit.htm.
51. Id.
52. These plans satisfy the requirements of I.R.C. §401(k) (2001).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-(i)(b)(1)(iii) (2001).
54. Id.
55. The ESOP, for example, is a form of defined contribution plan in which the invest-
ments are primarily in employer stock.
56. A money purchase plan requires fixed annual employer contributions to individual
employee accounts account and is subject to certain funding and other rules.
57. I.R.C. §403(b) (2001).
58. See Ann Perry, Authors Berate 401(k)s as a "Great Hoax", SAN DIEGO UNION & TRI.,
June 16, 2002, at H1, available at 2002 WL 4608597. 401(k)s held promise for employees
since they theoretically allowed workers to share in the wealth to be gained through in-
vestment -just like the upper class. This belief seemed reality in during the rising market,
but will, according to some authors, turn out a "hoax." Id. Employees also like the port-
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Employers offer, or transition from, traditional defined benefit
plans to defined contributions plans because of their reduced cost,
ease in administration and reduced risk to the employer who no
longer is responsible for management of the employee-invested
plan.59 Once intended as a supplement to the traditional retire-
ment plan, defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, have
become the standard."° Whereas employers once used defined
benefit plans as the standard component in compensation pack-
ages as a means to encourage employee loyalty, employers have
found for themselves that the benefits of offering defined contribu-
tion plans outweigh those traditional concerns.61 Both profit shar-
ability. Retirement Security: Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension
Plans Before the Subcommittee on Oversight Committee on House Ways and Means, 2002
WL 20318367 (statement of Jonathan Skinner, Ph.D Economics).
59. Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 2002 WL
2031837 1(statement of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation); Wyatt, supra note 58. Employers also choose defined contribution plans for
the tax benefits. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. Some experts cite federal regu-
lation and complexity of administration as the primary reason for employer preference for
defined contribution plans. See Statement of Ron Gebhadtsbauer, supra note 44. Employ-
ers chose to convert to defined contribution plans since they cost less than the traditional
defined benefit plan. See Ann Perry, supra note 58. Employers also appreciate the admin-
istrative simplicity of defined contribution plans. Statement of Jonathan Skinner, Ph.D.,
supra note 58.
60. Although employer participation in offering private pensions has not changed, the
"mix" has: employers now offer more defined contribution plans. Statement of Steven A.
Kandarian, supra note 59. ( "The percentage of the private sector workforce that has a
defined benefit plan declined from 38 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1998. In 1980, over
80 percent of workers with a pension plan had a defined benefit plan. By 1998, that per-
centage had dropped to less than 50 percent. In 1980, about two-thirds of workers who had
a defined benefit plan had no other employer-sponsored plan; by 1998, that ratio had re-
versed with only about one-third having no other plan. As defined benefit plans declined,
401(k) plans, a type of defined contribution plan, grew. Introduced in the early 1980s, the
number of 401(k) plans grew from 17,000 in 1984 to over 300,000 in 1998.")
According to the PBGC,
Today, there are more than 35,000 private-sector defined benefit plans insured by
PBGC. This compares with a high of about 114,000 in 1985. Since the mid-1980's
there has been a shift away from defined benefit plans toward defined contribution
plans, especially 401(k) plans. In 1980, defined benefit plans were the primary pen-
sion plan for over 80 percent of workers with single-employer private pensions. By
1998, this share had fallen to less than 50 percent. By 1996, 401(k) plans had become
the primary plan for 25 percent of single-employer workers.
http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/dbbenfit.htm. See also Statement of Ron
Gebhardtsbauer, supra note 44.("Just after ERISA was signed into law in 1975, 40% of the
labor force participated in a DB plan, and 16% participated in a DC plan (see Chart I).
Today, however, the reverse is true: only 21% participate in a DB plan, while 46% partici-
pate in a DC plan."); Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement
Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (describing
the rapid growth of the use of 401(k) plans).
61. See supra note 60. Union plans still remain largely defined benefit plans. State-
ment of Karen D. Friedman, supra note 11.
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ing and stock bonus plans allow an employer with uncertain prof-
its the ability to tailor contributions to the availability of funds.62
Defined contribution plans do not promise a specific amount of
retirement benefits, paying only what has accrued or remains in
the account and therefore, "[b]y definition... can never [have] an
insufficiency of funds.. .because each beneficiary is entitled to
whatever assets are dedicated to his or her individual account." 3
Although ERISA regulates participation, funding, vesting, ac-
crual, fiduciary duty and disclosure requirements for both defined
benefit and defined contribution plans,64 the PBGC guarantees
only relate to defined benefit plans and fail to protect benefits of
defined contribution plans.65
3. Hybrids: Cash Balance and Floor Offset Plans
"The only type of defined benefit plan that is increasing in
number is the cash balance plan."66 "In 1985, Bank of America
radically transformed its traditional retirement program... [which]
was quickly dubbed a cash balance plan because it looks like-and
more importantly, employees perceived it to be like-a profit shar-
ing or thrift, savings capital accumulation plan."67 Cash balance
plans, as defined benefit plans,68 are protected under the Pension
62. 1 MICHAEL J. CANAN & DAVID RHETT BAKER, QUAL. RETIREMENT PLANS § 3.111 (2002
ed.)
63. Motzenbecker, supra note 42, at 287 (quoting Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp.
2d 812, 817 (S.D. Ind. 2000)).
64. U.S. Department of Labor, What You Should Know About Your Pension Plan,
available at http://www.dol.gov/pwba/pubs/wyskgreenbook.pdf.
65. Id. See also Motzenbecker, supra note 42, at 287. This is the most important dis-
tinction between defined benefit and defined contribution plans for purposes of this paper.
When defined benefit plan participants, for example, lose their pensions due to employer
mismanagement, PBGC pays the floor insured amount of the participants' benefits and
seeks the remaining amount from the employer. ERISA directly protects the employee in
that case. The employee is also allowed to sue, through ERISA, in the name of the plan.
When defined contribution plan participants lost their pension due to employer misman-
agement, PBGC does not insure their benefits, so their only recourse is to sue through
ERISA. Id.
66. Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, supra note 59.
67. Vincent Amoroso, Cash Balance Plans, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 339
(Feb. 22, 1988).
68. Eaton, 117 F. Supp.2d at 817. See also IRS Notice 96-8 (Jan. 18, 1996), which
states cash balance plans are not defined contribution plans but defined benefit plans.
Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and
Pensions, 106th Cong. 5 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (listing IBM, AT&T, CitiGroup,
Bell Atlantic, SBC Communications, CIGNA Corp., AETNA, Eastman Kodak, and CBS
among the most notable and controversial companies that have converted to cash balance
plans.).
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Benefit Guarantee Corporation,' although whether or not such
arrangements are entirely proper has been seriously questioned.7"
Employees' accounts are credited with a portion of their salary
and interest each year.71 However, the employee's "account" is
accounted for separately from the pool of assets and the defined
benefit is determined in a defined contribution method.7" Cash
balance plans typically give beneficiaries the choice of receiving a
lump sum disbursement (as if it was from their own account) or
receiving annuities purchased with the account balance.73 Cash
balance plans do not depend on employee contribution, where as
defined contribution plans, like 401(k)s, are necessarily dependent
upon employee contribution; and because they are considered
defined benefit plans, cash balance plans are PBGC protected.'
69. Motzenbecker, supra note 42, at 287.
70. John M. Vince & Robert S. Newman, Cash Balance Plan Litigation, Practicing Law
Institute, 664 PLL/LIT 347 (Oct. 2001) ("The lawsuits challenging cash balance plans have
raised age discrimination, benefit accrual, fiduciary duty, and advance notice claims. These
suits have had mixed results."). Because cash balance plans must comply with defined
benefit rules under ERISA and the IRC, their defined contribution characteristics often
clash with those requirements. For example, the retirement benefit must be able to be
projected, and this is difficult with a cash balance plan without violating other contribution
rules. See also Amoroso, supra note 67.
71. Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, supra note 59.
72. This appears confusing at first but is relatively clear. Visiting the Department of
Labor website, in this case, would lead to devastating confusion for most employees and
should be avoided by all except a few cerebral lawyers. The text reads:
In other words, a cash balance plan defines the promised benefit in terms of a stated
account balance. In a typical cash balance plan, a participant's account is credited
each year with a "pay credit" (such as 5 percent of compensation from his or her em-
ployer) and an "interest credit" (either a fixed rate or a variable rate that is linked to
an index such as the one-year treasury bill rate). Increases and decreases in the
value of the plan's investments do not directly affect the benefit amounts promised to
participants. Thus, the investment risks and rewards on plan assets are borne solely
by the employer. When a participant becomes entitled to receive benefits under a
cash balance plan, the benefits that are received are defined in terms of an account
balance. The benefits in most cash balance plans, as in most traditional defined bene-
fit plans, are protected, within certain limitations, by federal insurance provided
through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
U.S. Department of Labor Retirement Plans, Benefits and Savings, available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm.
Obviously, the website editors are not familiar with the journalistic rule dictating newspa-
per readers - the average American - reads at a 6t h Grade level. The irony is so obvious
considering one of the main complaints critics have of the private pension system is that
employee investors do not understand their options or the choices they are expected to
make.
73. Motzenbecker, supra note 42, at 287.
74. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration on Cash Blance
Pension Plans (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.dol.gov/pwba/pubs/cashbq&a.htm.
82 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 41
4. The 401(k) Defined Contribution Plan
This article will address the 401k plan in greater detail since
the losses in these plans was the focus of the emotional response
to the Enron debacle. Most of the sensation concerning the unfor-
tunate employees at Enron revolves around the losses they have
experienced in their 401(k) plans. A 401(k) Plan - or qualified
cash or deferred arrangement ("CODA") - is named after the In-
ternal Revenue Code §401(k) requirements the plan must meet75
as a qualified plan for special tax treatment. After a long debate
of whether or not to allow pre-tax contributions to a retirement
plan, §401(k) was added to the Federal Tax Code by the Revenue
Act of 1978.76 The Act also added §402(a)(8) to the Internal Reve-
nue Code, which set forth the applicable rules.77 After multiple
amendments and revisions, a comprehensive set of final regula-
75. I.R.C. § 401(k) (1986). Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 pro-
vides:
(k) Cash or deferred arrangements.-(1) General rule.--A profit-sharing or stock bo-
nus plan, a pre-ERISA money purchase plan, or a rural cooperative plan shall not be
considered as not satisfying the requirements of subsection (a) merely because the
plan includes a qualified cash or deferred arrangement.
(2) Qualified cash or deferred arrangement.--A qualified cash or deferred arrange-
ment is any arrangement which is part of a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan, a pre-
ERISA money purchase plan, or a rural cooperative plan which meets the require-
ments of subsection (a)--
(A) under which a covered employee may elect to have the employer make payments
as contributions to a trust under the plan on behalf of the employee, or to the em-
ployee directly in cash;
(B) under which amounts held by the trust which are attributable to employer contri-
butions made pursuant to the employee's election--
(i) may not be distributable to participants or other beneficiaries earlier than--
(I) severance from employment, death, or disability,
(II) an event described in paragraph (10),
(III) in the case of a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan, the attainment of age 59
1/2,or
(IV) in the case of contributions to a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan to which sec-
tion 402(e)(3) applies, upon hardship of the employee, and
(ii) will not be distributable merely by reason of the completion of a stated period of
participation or the lapse of a fixed number of years;
(C) which provides that an employee's right to his accrued benefit derived from em-
ployer contributions made to the trust pursuant to his election is nonforfeitable,
and(D) which does not require, as a condition of participation in the arrangement,
that an employee complete a period of service with the employer (or employers) ...
Id.
76. Utz, supra note 35.
77. Id.
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tions was issued in August 1991,8 401k plans became very popu-
lar in the mid 1980s.79
In a qualified 401(k), amounts are not subject to Federal or
State taxes until paid (effectively, a deferred wage to a time when
the employee's income will move to a lower bracket at retire-
ment)"o and are subject to non-discrimination rules in order to re-
ceive such treatment.8 Employers receive an immediate deduc-
tion for contributions.82
Employees prefer such arrangements because they feel more in
control of their retirement funds and appreciate the portability of
the accounts." Employees have a portion of their pre-tax salary
dollars, sometimes with an employer match, contributed on their
behalf to the 401(k)."4 401(k) plans have a dollar limitation for the
amount the employee can defer and often employees can direct the
investment.88 There is however no limitation on the amount the
plan can accumulate over time. An employee can withdraw funds
from his 401(k) plan as a loan or as a hardship withdrawal.86 Em-
ployees who separate from a particular employer are given 60
days to roll their 401(k) amounts into another qualified retirement
plan or IRA before the amounts are taxable.87 Starting in 2002,
contribution levels in 401(k) plans will increase $1,000 a year from
the current $10,000, eventually capping out at $15,000 in 2006.88
In addition, workers over the age of fifty will be allowed to make
extra "catch-up" contributions to their retirement plans.89
"During recent years, growing numbers of employees have
changed -- or been shifted by their employers -- to defined-
78. Id. See also Certain Cash or Deferred Arrangements and Employee and Matching
Contributions Under Employee Plans, 56 Fed. Reg. 40, 507 (Aug. 15, 1991).
79. See supra note 60.
80. I.R.C. § 402(a) (2001).
81. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4) (2001) (nondiscrimination in contributions or benefits
under plan), 410(b) (2001) (nondiscriminatory coverage of employees).
82. I.R.C. §§ 404(a)(1), (3) (2001). See also Michael J. Collins, Reviving Defined Bene-
fit Plans: Anaylsis and Suggestions for Reform, 20 VA. TAX REv. 599 (2001).
83. See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text regarding defined contribution plans.
84. httpJ/www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm.
85. Id. For a historical treatment of the plans, see Utz, supra note 35. 401(k) settled
the long debate over salary reductions as deferred compensation set aside in such plans.
Id.
86. http://www.dol.gov/pwba/pubs/youknow/knowl.htm#401. See also IRS Tax Topic
424, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics. Early withdrawals, however, incur an addi-
tional 10% tax as a penalty. See IRS Tax Topic 558, available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics.
87. IRS Tax Topic 413, available at http'//www.irs.gov/taxtopics.
88. I.R.C. § 402(g)(1)(2001).
89. I.R.C. § 414(v) (2001).
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contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, whose payouts depend on
how much an employee invests and the performance of those in-
vestments, which are more lightly regulated."90
The controversy surrounding an employee investing in company
stock in 401(k) plans centers on a plan sponsor's obligation to look
out for the financial interests of participants. Although most ex-
perts say it's not prudent to put more than 10% or 20% of a portfo-
lio in one stock, there are no rules limiting the amount of company
stock in 401(k) plans.9"
There are two interesting caveats: this flexibility does not apply
unless the investment in employer security is discretionary on the
part of the employee and the plan is designated an SOP.92 "Tradi-
tional pension plans [i.e.(defined benefit plans)], on the other
hand, are barred from investing more than 10% in company
stock."93 At many companies, including Enron, matching contribu-
tions are available to 401(k) participants only in company stock.94
Most companies, including Enron, do not let employees sell that
stock before they reach a certain age, usually 50." "According to a
study of 401(k) plans by Fidelity Investments, only 4% of plans let
participants immediately exchange matching contributions of
company stock."96 No law prevents employers from imposing such
restrictions.
As of 2001, the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (PSCA)
estimates that there are 700,000 defined-contribution plans in the
United States,97 consisting of more than 37 million participants99
90. Kathy Chen, Fight Looms Over Pension-Plan Changes --- Enron's Consequences
Lead Legislators to Pursue Tightening Regulations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at A2, avail-
able at 2001 WL-WSJ 3383581.
91. Christine Dugas, Energy giant's disaster devastates 401(k) Plans; Dabacle shows
risk of loading up on employer's stock, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2001, at 1B, available at 2001
WL 5477587.
92. ERISA § 407(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
93. Dugas, supra note 91. It is curious that when employers are at risk, diversification
is protected more vigilantly than when only the employee is at risk. This may be due to
the fact that the employee is only at risk for his or her plan while the employer is at risk for
all employee amounts. This, however, is more evidence for the need to impress the same
standard upon the individual. The exclusion from the 10% limit will also not apply unless
the fair market value of assets in the individual account plans do not exceed 10% of the
assets in all the employer's plans, any elective deferral required to be invested in employer
security cannot exceed 10% of employees compensation. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. For a graphic representation of 401(k) assets, see Appendix 3.
96. Id.
97. http://www.psa.org/data/dcsstats3.asp. As of 2001, up from 1978, when there ap-
peared to be only a little over 300,000 such plans. Id.
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with combined assets totaling approximately $1.8 trillion.99 401(k)
plans seem attractive to employees, but 401(k) plans do not guar-
antee anything."' A significant amount of those assets are held in
employer stock:
Workers are proud to own the stock of the company that gives
them a paycheck. According to Plansponsor, a magazine that
discusses retirement issues, 24.6 percent of participant bal-
ances were invested in company stock. While that is signifi-
cantly less than the stock ownership in the Enron 401(k) plan
it is still a dangerously high level.01
Unlike defined benefit plans, no similar safety net under the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation exists for 401(k) plan,
profit-sharing plans and employee stock-ownership plans of com-
panies that fail. As stated earlier, these defined contribution
plans are not covered under PBGC. Since employees solely bear
the risk for these investments, employees who are victim of fraud
or breach of fiduciary duties must seek restitution for plan losses
under ERISA's fiduciary provisions or under applicable state laws.
C. ERISA'S Relationship to 401(k) - The 404(c) Rule
Although ERISA does not protect 401(k) plans from risk of loss,
the trustee of the 401(k) is usually subject to the fiduciary and
enforcement rules under ERISA."'
ERISA includes a special rule for accounts like Enron's, which
"effectively enables defined contribution pension plans (such as
profit sharing, 401(k), money purchase pension, and employee
stock ownership plans) to permit plan participants to choose how
the assets in their accounts are invested."' Under this special
98. Daniel Kadlec, Your Money: Old Safety Nets are Gone. Here's What to Do. TIME,
Jan. 28, 2002, at 26, available at, 2002 WL 8385618.
99. Id.
100. Daniel Kadlec, You're On Your Own: The Enron Lesson, TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, at 26,
available at 2002 WL 8385617.
101. Keller Rohrback, L.L.P., Enron Shockwaves Will Rock Workers' View of Employee
Retirement Plans (Nov. 30, 2001), at http-/www.enronerisa.com/news/newsll300l.html.
102. ERISA §§ 404, 501.
103. Utz, supra note 35, at 67. See also ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104:
Fiduciary duties: (c) Control over assets by participant or beneficiary
(1) In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and permits a
participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his account, if a par-
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rule, a plan participant (or beneficiary) who is permitted to direct
the investment of his or her account, in what is called a "partici-
pant-directed pension," will not be considered a fiduciary solely by
reason of his or her ability to make those investment decisions. 1°4
Most notably, "the plan's fiduciaries are not liable for losses or
breaches of fiduciary duty, which result from the participant's or
beneficiary's investment decisions."'' However, "for fiduciaries of
a defined contribution plan to enjoy the protection afforded by
§404(c) of ERISA, participants and beneficiaries must be provided
with an opportunity (a) to exercise control over the assets in their
individual accounts, and (b) to choose from a broad range of in-
vestment options." °6 Independence of investment decision and
accurate representation regarding potential investments are key
factors."°7
Some commentators view §404(c) more as an insulation for em-
ployers than as a protection for employees.
Absent [the provision's] protection, were a participant permitted
to direct the investment of his or her account, and were that par-
ticipant to choose not to diversify the assets in his or her account,
the trustee or other plan fiduciaries might be held liable for the
ticipant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined
under regulations of the Secretary)
(A) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by rea-
son of such exercise, and (B) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be li-
able under this part for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from
such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control. (2) In the case of a simple
retirement account established pursuant to a qualified salary reduction ar-
rangement under section 408(p) of Title 26, a participant or beneficiary shall,
for purposes of paragraph (1), be treated as exercising control over the assets in
the account upon the earliest of-(A) an affirmative election among investment
options with respect to the initial investment of any contribution, (B) a rollover
to any other simple retirement account or individual retirement plan, or (C)
one year after the simple retirement account is established.
Id.
104. Utz, supra note 35.
105. Id. at 68.
106. Id. (quoting 29. C.F.R.§ 2550.404(c)- 1(b)(1)).
107. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(c)-1(c)(2). The investment decision will not be under inde-
pendent control if:
the participant or beneficiary is subjected to improper influence by a plan fiduciary or
the plan sponsor with respect to the transaction, (ii) a plan fiduciary has concealed
from the participant or beneficiary material non-public facts regarding the invest-
ment, unless disclosure would violate federal or state law, or (iii) the responsible plan
fiduciary takes instructions from a participant or beneficiary it knows is legally in-
competent.
CANAN & BAKER, supra note 62, § 16.3.
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adverse consequences to the participant of his or her own failure
to diversify.
108
Others disagree with this assessment and predict that employ-
ers are going to be sued regardless of 404(c)'s protection. 109 It is
clear that the employers or other fiduciaries remain at risk under
404(c) because the relevant regulations provide that: the partici-
pant must exercise independent control, meaning, for fiduciaries
to enjoy Section 404(c) protection, participants or beneficiaries
making investment elections must exercise independent control
with respect to those decisions. Their exercise and control will not
be considered independent if any of the following occurs:
a. Improper Influence. The participant or beneficiary is sub-
ject to improper influence by a plan fiduciary or the plan
sponsor.
b. Concealment of Facts. A plan fiduciary has concealed mate-
rial non-public facts regarding the investment decision, unless
that disclosure to the participant or beneficiary would violate
any provision of federal law or a provision of state law which
is not preempted by ERISA.
c. Participant Incompetent. The participant or beneficiary is
legally incompetent and a responsible plan fiduciary accepts
investment instructions knowing the participant or benefici-
ary to be legally incompetent."0
Under Regulation 404(c) the employer may offer company stock
as an investment option. A study of the investment choices made
by 401(k) plan participants indicates that when company stock is
offered as an investment option, 32.7% of employees select it as
one of their investments. Whether this is due to feelings of com-
pany loyalty or a drive for alignment with the employer it is an
investment strategy fraught with risk.'
108. Utz, supra note 35.
109. Medill, supra note 34, at 469.
110. Utz, supra note 35. See also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(c)-1(c)(2). Cases under 404(c)
include: In re Unisys Say. Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996); Allison v. Bank One-
Denver, 289 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir., 2002).
111. Medill, supra note 34, at 480 (citations omitted).
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D. Deductions to Employers - The Moral Hazard to Offer Stock
The tax breaks offered to employers for such private plans,
when added to government and military plans, constitutes "the
largest of all Federal tax subsidies.""2 As long as plans remain
qualified' under the Internal Revenue Code, they provide tax
benefits to employers and employees."' For example, employees
can contribute pre-tax dollars to a 401(k) and not be taxed on that
deferred wage until retirement - when their tax liability hopefully
will be significantly lower. However, if a plan becomes "disquali-
fied," in most situations the employee is liable for tax on the in-
come deemed earned while the employer maintains the identical
deduction for wages."'
One aspect of a 401(k) is the benefit to employers to use contri-
butions as deductions on federal returns. "Company stock in re-
tirement plans is generating billions of dollars in tax deductions
each year for thousands of companies, including Sears, Roebuck &
Co., Lockheed Martin Corp., McDonald's Corp., Bank of America
Corp., Ford Motor Co., and Procter & Gamble Co.""6 Additionally,
companies are not normally allowed to deduct dividends they pay,
but they may if the stock is held by an ESOP or a certain type of
hybrid 401(k), called a KSOP. KSOPs are created when a company
marries its 401(k) to its ESOP; this makes the company stock in
the 401(k) eligible for the dividend deduction, too. Savings from
additional tax deduction can be substantial. This fact was noted
on an August 2001 newsletter that Towers Perrin, a benefits con-
sulting firm, sent to clients:...
112. Statement of Karen D. Friedman, supra note 11.
113. A qualified plan is one that meets the criteria under I.R.C. § 401(a) (2001).
114. If at any time the plan becomes disqualified contributions from the employee and
employer will not receive the beneficial tax treatment and disbursements at retirement are
treated differently. See I.R.C. Pub. 575, available at http//www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf
(2002 ed.). Of course, the employer still receives the deduction for wages paid while the
employee needs to immediately pay income tax.
115. This seems particularly harsh when innocent employees are taxed when execu-
tives use bad judgment in plan administration or development. There is precedent for not
holding the employee responsible for tax if the employer is responsible for the disqualifica-
tion. I.R.C. § 402(b)(4)(2001).
116. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, The Wall Street Journal Companies' Hot Tax
Break: 401(k)s: Why Firms Stuff Plans With Stock, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2002, at C1, avail-
able at 2002 WL-WSJ 3384606.
117. Id. ("Pfizer Inc., a drug maker, is also converting its 401(k) plan to a KSOP. Pfizer
paid some $60 million in dividends to its retirement plans in 2000, which could bring Pfizer
a tax deduction of $23.4 million ..... With an annual dividend yield of 1.6%, the $2.3 billion
in Anheuser-Busch stock in the ESOP and 401(k), which accounts for 83% of the plans'
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These big but little-noticed tax benefits are a reason that com-
panies use their own stock in retirement plans and, in many
cases, lock employees into them until age 50 or later."8 If em-
ployees are allowed more flexibility in diversifying the
holdings in their retirement plans, it would probably lead to
fewer company shares in many plans, cutting the tax deduc-
tions that employers enjoy.
119
Employer groups are lobbying against any major changes in
laws governing retirement-savings plans. 'If providing stock to an
employee no longer has any value to the employer, then of course
the employer is going to stop doing it,' says Mark Ugoretz, presi-
dent of the ERISA Industry Committee, which represents major
employers.'°
E. What We Have Built: The Retirement-House of Straw
In summary, the modern-day employer, taking advantage of the
tax benefits and recognizing the needs of the mobile workforce has
gladly transitioned to the less burdensome and less risky defined
contribution plans. With the defined contribution plans qualifying
for the shift of risk to the employee and reduced fiduciary respon-
sibility under ERISA 404(c), employers have no need to be con-
cerned about the fiduciary duties normally ascribed to them for
the traditional defined benefit plan. Of course, and most ironi-
cally, these plans to which the employee bears the sole risk is ex-
actly the type of plan uninsured under PBGC.
II. THE COLLAPSE & THE BIG BAD WOLF
A. Enron's Pensions"'
1. Enron's Defined Benefit Pension - The Lesser Concern
"[T]here are at least three defined benefit plans insured by
PBGC in the Enron corporate group - the underfunded Enron
Corporation Plan ("Enron Plan"), currently named the Enron Cor-





121. A detailed description of Enron's pension system is contained in the class action
suit Tittle v. Enron, available at http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint.html.
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poration Cash Balance Plan, and two others that are fully funded
on a termination basis, based on the most recent actuarial infor-
mation."122 The failed energy company had an unusual arrange-
ment that connected its defined benefit pensions in a "floor offset"
arrangement tied to its defined contribution, employee stock own-
ership plan ("ESOP").'23 As discussed earlier, in these arrange-
ments, the benefits employees earn in one plan can essentially
erase benefits they earn in the other.14 Questions as to the legality
of the particular plan arrangement and valuation remain with the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation reporting a possible $125
million exposure of the underfunded Enron pensions.' However,
the underfunding of Enron's defined benefit plans are a less sen-
sational concern for retirees since such benefits are protected to a
certain extent through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corpora-
tion.
126
122. Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, supra note 48. ("The Enron Plan is currently a
cash balance plan but has had a variety of benefit formulas in its history. The plan started
out as a traditional final average pay plan, was substantially changed to an arrangement
known as a "floor-offset Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)," which will be addressed
in the latter portion of this article, and finally became a cash balance plan. The changes in
benefit formula did not affect benefits earned in prior years. Thus, a person who worked for
Enron under all three arrangements has a defined benefit pension consisting of three sepa-
rate components.").
123. See infra notes 127-142 and accompanying text for ESOP description. One should
note, ESOPs are more vehicles of corporate finance than of employee benefit plans. See
infra notes 127-142.
124. This may be most true in Enron's case since its offset, thorough clever valuing,
essentially reduced benefits - possibly in violation of ERISA § 203. See also Ellen E.
Shultz, U.S. Taxpayers May Have to Pay Enron Workers' Pension Benefits, WALL ST. J., Feb.
27, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3387156; Ellen E. Schultz, Questioning the
Books: Pension Practices Used by Enron Come Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2002, at A4,
available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3387404. ("Enron calculated the ESOP offsets in an unusual
way. It based the offsets on the price of Enron stock from 1996 to 2000, when it was trading
between $37.75 and $43.44. It then used the higher locked-in values of the ESOP accounts
to permanently cut the value of pensions that employees had earned between January 1987
and January 1995... .There is now some question as to whether this practice -- which per-
manently erased some of the pension benefits -- constituted an illegal reduction in pension
benefits under federal pension law...."What was promised originally was that the employ-
ees would get the greater of the two benefits -- the pension or the ESOP," says William K.
Carr, a Denver pension attorney. "Then Enron changed the deal by fixing the amount of the
offset even if the value of the stock went down." Now that the stock has become worthless,
the employees get nothing from the ESOP, but their pensions are still permanently reduced
by the past value of the stock...."That could be a cutback in benefits, because before the
change, the employees were protected if the ESOP went down, but afterward they were
not," says Mr. Carr, who isn't involved in any Enron litigation.")
125. Kathy Chen, Questioning the Books: Enron Pensions Are Insured By U.S. Pro-
gram, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3387259.
126. Id. See discussion infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text for role and duties of
the PBGC. The PBGC limited protection, as discussed, pays a floor of the promised benefit
and seeks the remaining amount from the employer.
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2. Enron's 401(k) Defined Contribution Plan - The Greater
Concern
"Most of the public focus has been on Enron's 401(k) and em-
ployee stock ownership plans."127  These plans are not defined
benefit plans, they are defined contribution plans and as such, are
not insured by the PBGC."' Therefore, Enron employees are "tak-
ing it on the chin" when it comes to losses in their 401(k) plans.
The Enron Corporation Savings Plan, 401(k), is an "employee pen-
sion benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA § 3(2)(A)."' Fur-
ther, it is an "eligible individual account plan" within the meaning
of ERISA § 407(d)(3)13' and also a "qualified cash or deferred ar-
rangement" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 401(k). 3'
Enron is the sponsor of the Plan. 132 The participants of the Plan
were permitted to contribute from 1% to 15% of their eligible base
pay to the Plan.3 3 Participants directed the investment of their
contributions, in 1% increments, to the various investment options
available to the Plan. Most of these options were diversified mu-
tual funds."M However, the options also included the Enron Cor-
poration Stock Fund and the Enron Oil & Gas Stock Fund (with-
out distinction, the "Company Stock Funds").15  The Company
Stock Funds invested solely in company stock (and a small portion
in cash equivalents for liquidity).136 Enron matched participants'
contributions, at certain specified percentages, by making contri-
butions to the participants' account into the Company Stock
127. Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, supra note 48
128. Id.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988 Supp.). For ERISA purposes, an employee welfare
benefit plan is:
Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of pro-
viding for its participants or their beneficiaries ....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988 Supp.).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3) (1994 & Supp. v 2000).
131. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2001).
132. Keller Rohrback, L.L.P., The Plan, available at
http'//www.enronerisa.com/plan.html. See also Press Release, Mark A. Palmer, Enron
Corp., Enron Explains Basic Facts About its 401(k) Savings Plan (Dec. 14, 2001), available
at http'//www.enron.com/corp/pressromm/releases/2001/ene/100-121401ReleaseLtr.html.
133. Rohrback, The Plan, available at http'//www.enronerisa.com/plan.html. See also






Funds."7 These investments were frozen in the Company Stock
Funds in most cases until the participant reached age fifty.'
As with most of these companies, Enron matched contributions
to their 401(k) with shares of Enron stock, and also offered Enron
stock as an investment choice, in addition to a variety of about
twenty investment options.' According to Enron, the company
provided a 50% match on employees' 401(k) contributions of up to
six percent of their base pay. Stock holdings from the company
match could not be transferred into other investment options until
the employee reached age fifty. 140  "Enron employees had always
been able to transfer their own contributions in the 401(k), at any
time."' 4' These provisions are apparently in compliance with
ERISA diversification of investment provisions. At the end of last
year, $ 1.3 billion of the plan's $ 2.1 billion in assets, or 67% of the
assets in Enron 401(k) retirement plans, was invested in Enron
stock. 41 When the value of the Enron stock soared, employees
were understandably pleased with their 401k plan choices and no
doubt made grand preparations for retirement.
137. Id.
138. Rohrback, The Plan, available at http'//www.enronerisa.com/plan.html. See also
Enron Press Release, Dec. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/pressromm/releases/2001/ene/lOOl2l4OlReleaseLtr.html.
Another source reports Enron matched employee contributions to tax code Section 401(k)
plans in company stock, but that they were required to hold until age 54. See Kurt Ritter-
pusch, Retirement Policy: Enron, Enron, Enron,: Retirement Issues From Fallout Expected
to Dominate Agenda, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 29, No. 5, at 331 (Jan. 29, 2002).
139. Enron Press Release, Dec. 14, 2001, supra note 132.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Theo Francis & Ellen Schultz, Enron Faces Suits Over Pension Plan-Participants
Suffered Losses Because of Company's Plunging Stock, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2001, at
Ml, available at 2001 WL-WSJA 29657796. According to the SEEC suit, 54% of the assets
were in Enron stock. See also: CNN, A Reaction to Enron Pension Meltdown, Bill Calls for
More Diversification, CNN MONEY, Dec. 18, 2001; Grace Shim, Retirees Gasping at Enron,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 16, 2001, at 1D, available at 2001 WL 9593443. Frank
Rathbun, an Omaha retiree, said Enron had several retirement plans. Some had pension
payments taken care of by an insurance company. Overall, the pensions were based on a
percentage of the top salary received over the final five years of employment, he said.").
Management of the plans included Prudential Insurance Company of America. See Shim,
supra. Northern Trust Company was also responsible, as were the auditors, Arthur Ander-
sen LLP. See Ellen E. Shultz & Theo Francis, Enron Isn't the Only Retirement Tale That
Leads to Hard Lesson: 'Diversify', WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL-
WSJ 3383473. Northern Trust, too, says it was a directed trustee without investment au-
thority. "We held the assets and we kept the records," spokeswoman Sue Rageas said. An-
dersen declined to comment.")
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B. And I'll Huff, and I'll Puff... Enron Comes Down
The issues surrounding Enron, its accountants and its employ-
ees consumed the media for several months, with Enron coverage
second only to the 9-11 tragedy and the corresponding war on ter-
rorism. Enron was our domestic discussion, overshadowing last
years' Patients' Bill of Rights, Education Reform and even
Chandra Levy's disappearance. As a quick refresher of the issue,
the following will serve as a sketch of the facts relevant to the
pension discussion.'"
"Enron marketed electricity and natural gas, delivered energy
and other physical commodities, and provided financial and risk
management services to customers around the world."'45 "Gold-
man Sachs analyst David Fleischer stated: 'Enron has built
unique and, in our view, extraordinary franchises in several busi-
ness units in very large markets." 46 "In 1990 around 80% of its
revenues came from the regulated gas-pipeline business, but by
2000, 95% of its revenues and more than 80% of its operating prof-
its came from 'wholesale energy operations and services.' This
business, which Enron pioneered, is usually described in vague,
grandiose terms like the 'financialization of energy'--but also,
more simply, as 'buying and selling gas and electricity. '""'47
What was Enron, really? In essence, it was an insurance com-
pany. Some would say a hedge fund. It wasn't just selling gas and
megawatts, coal and bandwidth. It was selling protection, stability
and peace-of-mind. For a price, with the click of a mouse, you
could lock-in reportable up-front profits, or limit potential losses,
on a myriad of commodities, for a myriad of volumes, time periods
and delivery terms. And, at every turn, Enron would book a
profit.1
48
144. The class action suit reveals the entire detailed account of the rise and fall of En-
ron. See Enron Complaint, available at http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint.html.
145. Enron Press Release, Dec. 14, 2001, supra note 132. ("Enron's Internet address is
http://www.enron.com/corp. The stock is traded under the ticker symbol 'ENE'.").
146. Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced? It's in a bunch of complex businesses. Its
financial statements are nearly impenetrable. So why is Enron trading at such a huge
multiple? FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122.
147. Id.
148. Platts Global Energy, at http://www.platts.com/features/enron/timeline.shtml.
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Enron's future looked bright.'4 9  Offstage, away from the lime-
light and fancy special effects, some financial and media experts
were quick to admit that the company remains largely impenetra-
ble to outsiders ... How exactly does Enron make its money? De-
tails are hard to come by because Enron keeps many of the specif-
ics confidential for what it terms 'competitive reasons.' And the
numbers that Enron does present are often extremely complicated.
Even quantitatively minded "Wall Streeters" who scrutinize com-
panies for a living thought so. 'If you figure it out, let me know,'
laughs credit analyst Todd Shipman at S&P. 'Do you have a year?'
asks Ralph Pellecchia, Fitch's credit analyst, in response to the
same question.5 ° Enron pointed to proprietary rights to keep its
books secret. "We don't want to tell anyone where we're making
money.
Thanks to insider Sherron Watkins, the world now knows that
Enron hid billions of dollars in debts and operating losses inside
private partnerships, with attractive names like "Condor" and
"Raptor."'52  The corrected financial statements reported a
$1,165,000,000 overstatement of earnings for the year 2000
alone. "
149. Financial statements from that time demonstrate a solid organization, and inser-
tion here would normally be appropriate. However, the statements, since discovered to
misrepresent the company's finances are virtually meaningless.
150. McLean, supra note 146.
151. Id. According to Platts Global Energy, Platts Energy Economist Jan 30, available
at http'//www.platts.com/features/enron/timeline.shtml:
The upward earnings, from barely $100-mil in 1997 to almost $1-bil in 2000, gave its
story an air of unquestionable inevitability. If you didn't exactly catch where those
great numbers were coming from, well, you were just stupid. And since no one on
Wall Street will ever admit they don't understand something, everyone just nodded
and went on building the Enron myth. Privately, most analysts would admit they
didn't have a clue how the bullish numbers were generated. Enron had gone from be-
ing a solid gas pipeline company with a weird name to an impenetrable 'black box' of
rocket-science sleight of hand, impervious to outside analysis.Id.
152. Michael Duffy, et.al., What Did They Know And... When Did They Know It? Meet
Sherron Watkins, who sounded the alarm on Enron long before its collapse, TIME, Jan. 28,
2002, available at 2002 WL 8385615. ("We also learned, Enron's supposed "auditor" -
Anderson - fretted over the accounting, considered dropping Enron as a client, but ulti-
mately chose to keep its head down and collect its $50 million dollar yearly auditing and
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C. Sticks and Straw -A Result of the Lockout
As the world began to discover the ether that was Enron, addi-
tional suspicious activities directly affected employees' pensions.'55
The most devastating occurrence affecting employees' stock oc-
curred during the aptly named "lock out" period. Claims of fiduci-
ary breach, fraud or both, or at the very least, unethical conduct,
swirl around the lockout timeline:
A transaction lockout period is a period of time during a
change in recordkeepers, who also may be fund managers, in
which no participant financial transactions such as transfers,
withdrawals, loans, or distributions, are allowed."'56 "Em-
ployers switch recordkeepers to lower costs and improve plan
features for participants, such as adding online features, add-
ing more or different investment options, and shortening the
interval in which a participant may change investment or
contribution decisions from quarterly or monthly to daily.'57
The justification for this practice is to ensure proper bookkeep-
ing during the change of the guard: 'When companies change the
administrator of a 401(k) program, the temporary shutdown, typi-
cally lasting several weeks, is required to allow employee account
information to be accurately and completely transferred to the
new administrator.""1
8
The old recordkeeper suspends financial transactions during the
transition period to allow adequate time to (1) perform a final rec-
onciliation of participant records and plan assets, and (2) provide
the participant records to the new recordkeeper. The new record-
keeper imposes a suspension to allow adequate time to build par-
ticipant accounts on its system and verify their accuracy.
Financial transactions are suspended so the transition of par-
ticipant accounts and assets is not a "moving target." For exam-
ple, the new recordkeeper needs information about outstanding
participant loans to properly establish participants' accounts. If a
participant is allowed to take a new loan after that information is
155. See Appendix 1 for a complete Timeline.
156. Investments: Enron Section 401(k) Lock Out Raises Many Questions, PSCA Says,
Pens. & Ben. Rep (BNA) Vol. 29, No. 5, at 306 (Jan. 29, 2002). (Neither the IRC nor ERISA
regulate lockouts directly as it is an administrative device.)
157. Id.
158. Enron Press Release, Dec. 14, 2001, supra note 132.
159. Investments, supra note 156.
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conveyed to the new recordkeeper, the participant's account will
be inaccurate when established by the new recordkeeper. 6 °
The suspension period can last from a few days to more than a
month.161 Assets in participant directed plans usually remain in-
vested throughout the transition period in accordance with par-
ticipant directions given before the transition period begins. On
occasion, plan assets are transferred into a money market or other
"safe" fund during the transition."2  Throughout the transition
period new contributions are invested in accordance with the par-
ticipant's investment selection.'63 Approximately 24,000 plans
converted to new recordkeepers in 2001 according to the Society of
Professional Administrators and Recordkeepers. This figure rep-
resents 6.8 percent of all plans. Based on this 2001 data, any one
plan would on average change recordkeepers once every 14.7
164
years.
"In February of 2001, ostensibly in order to improve its 401(k)
plan, Enron requested proposals from third-party benefits firms to
take over administration of its plan."6 ' "After selecting a new
401(k) administrator, Enron notified all affected employees in a
mailing to their homes on October 4, stating that a transition pe-
riod would begin on October 29. Between the first notification and
the first day of the transition period, the company sent several
reminders to employees through the internal e-mail system."66
"The transition period during which employees were unable to
change investments in their 401(k) accounts lasted just 10 total
trading days, beginning on October 29 and ending on November
12, 2001. This transition applied to all plan participants, including
senior executives."167
Enron's stock fell 35 percent during the freezing of retirement
holdings. 6 ' From October 29, the first day of the temporary shut-
down, through November 13, while participants were blocked by





164. Investments, supra note 156.
165. Enron Press Release, Dec. 14, 2001, supra note 132.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. CNN, Fed In Enron Probe: U.S. labor department to probe crippled energy trader's
handling of pension plans, CNN MONEY, Dec. 5, 2001, at
http://money.cnn.com/2OO1/12/O5/companies/enron/index.htm.
169. Shim, supra note 142.
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price went from $13.81 to $9.98 - a drop of $3.83. On five of those
trading days, Enron's share price closed below $9.98.170
Enron stressed employee notice of the lockout, yet "company ex-
ecutives managed to shed much of their holdings before the fall,
while thousands of employees were locked into company stock-
laden retirement accounts that soon amounted to nothing."7'
There "seemed to be different rules for Enron executives, who
reaped huge financial rewards from sales of company stock, and
lower-level workers, who were prevented from unloading similar
shares in their personal pension funds."172
Suspicions remain considering the pre-lockout plan administra-
tor was Charles Schwab, a reputable, well-respected firm that
handles a significant number of pension plans.'73 One author
pointed out that the lockout occurred during a particularly suspect
time - providing more evidence of a "pump and dump" type opera-
tion"'74 - since "Schwab runs a very good 401(k) administration
plan, one that thousands of companies use. It seems more than
coincidental that suddenly a switch needed to be made."'75
Those charged with policing the company, such as Arthur An-
derson, responsible for audit of the company's financials, and the
law firm of Vinson & Elkins, responsible for reporting on the
legality of the questionable partnerships in response to internal
concerns, were subject to conflicts of interest. Faced with ap-
proximately $15 billion in debt, Enron and a number of its sub-
sidiaries filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York'76 in December,
170. Enron Press Release, Dec. 14, 2001, supra note 132. See Appendix 2 for a graphic
history of Enron share price since Nov. 2000 highs.
171. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
172. Ron Scherer & David R. Francis, Flameout: Enron Disaster Will Provide Lessons
For Years to Come, DESERET NEws, Jan. 20, 2002, at AA02, available at 2002 WL 3185732;
see Fed In Enron Probe, supra note 168.
173. See supra notes 155-179 and accompanying text under Lockout Section.
174. See supra notes 248-257 and accompanying text.
175. James J. Cramer, The Bottom Line, Pumping Enron, NY METRO ONLINE (Feb. 6,
2002), at
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/bizfinance/columns/bottomline/5645/index.ht
ml. "The Enron scandal isn't half as complicated as the press is making it out to be -- in
fact, it's one of Wall Street's oldest and most venerable scams." Id.
176. Press Release, Mark Palmer & Karen Denne, Enron Corp., Enron Files Voluntary
Petitions for Chapter 11 Reorganization; Sues Dynegy for Breach of Contract, Seeing Dam-
ages of at Least $10 Billion (Dec. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2001/ene/PressRelease ll-12-02
01letterhead.html ("Filings for Chapter 11 reorganization have been made for a total of 14
affiliated entities, including Enron Corp.; Enron North America Corp. , the company's
wholesale energy trading business; Enron Energy Services, the company's retail energy
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after Dynegy Inc. withdrew its bid to buy the Houston energy
trader.177 At the time of filing, Enron was officially the largest
bankruptcy court filing in U.S. history.' "When the seventh-
largest corporation crashes and burns, the wreckage is diverse and
scatters in many directions," says Robert Reischauer, president of
the Urban Institute in Washington.79
In short, Enron employees were heavily invested in Enron stock
and restricted from selling when the price crashed while high-
ranking executives were able to divest themselves and avoid
losses. Employees, obviously, want retirement funds to be made
whole. In an environment of misstated and possibly fraudulent
financials, questionable business structures, obvious conflicts of
interest between legal and accounting (auditing) services, the re-
tirement plans' questionable lack of diversification, holding and
lockout periods, while executives were arguably able to benefit at
the expense of employees' limited rights and knowledge, lends
strong evidence for claims of fiduciary breach and fraud.
marketing operations; Enron Transportation Services, the holding company for Enron's
pipeline operations; Enron Broadband Services, the company's bandwidth trading opera-
tion; and Enron Metals & Commodity Corp. Enron-related entities not included in the
Chapter 11 filing are not affected by the filing. These non-filing entities include Northern
Natural Gas Pipeline, Transwestern Pipeline, Florida Gas Transmission, EOT'T, Portland
General Electric & other Enron international entities."). All bankruptcy documents are
now available at http://www.elaw4enron.com.
177. Shim, supra note 142. See also Enron Press Release, Dec. 2, 2001, supra note
176. ("As part of the reorganization process, Enron also filed suit against Dynegy Inc.
(NYSE: DYN) in the same court, alleging breach of contract in connection with Dynegy's
wrongful termination of its proposed merger with Enron and seeking damages of at least
$10 billion. Enron's lawsuit also seeks the court's declaration that Dynegy is not entitled to
exercise its option to acquire an Enron subsidiary that indirectly owns Northern Natural
Gas Pipeline. Proceeds from the lawsuit would benefit Enron's creditors."). Enron and
Dynegy since settled. Press Release, Karen Denne, Enron Corp. & John Sousa, Dynegy,
Enron and Dynegy Announce Settlement of Merger-Related Litiga-
tion(Aug.15,2002),available at http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2002/ene/28-
081502ReleaseLtr.html.(Dynegy will pay Enron $25 million to settle the lawsuit Enron had
filed alleging breach of contract for wrongful termination of the merger. Enron has agreed
to release Dynegy from any and all claims relating to the terminated merger and to dismiss
such litigation.).
178. That was until recent events, i.e. WorldCom's "potential" filing took center stage.
Mitchell Tacelle & Carrick Mollenkamp, Leading the News: SEC Files Civil Suit Against
WorldCom --- If Banks Call In Loan Now, Forcing Bankruptcy Filing, $30 Billion in Bonds
Default, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A3, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3399075. ("If World-
Coin eventually seeks legal protection from creditors, it would be one of the largest bank-
ruptcies in history. As recently as March, it reported assets of $92 billion. By comparison,
when Enron Corp. and 13 subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy protection last December, they
listed assets of just under $50 billion."). WorldCom has since filed. See
http://www.elaw4enron.com/Worldcomdefault.asp.
179. Scherer & Francis, supra note 172.
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D. Aftermath
1. The Individual Employees' Plight
"Enron's employees, 15,000 of whom hold Enron stock in their
401(k) retirement plans, stood to be among the biggest losers in
the company's collapse."8 0
Moluf, the wife of a deceased Enron retiree who may no longer
be receiving medical or pension benefits, said that when she
learned the news about Enron, "It hit me like the Trade Center.'
181
"Enron stock in employees' 401(k) accounts that was worth $90 a
share 11/2 years ago is worth less than a $1 a share today.
" 18 2
"Many Enron employees lost 70 to 90 percent of their retirement
assets after the company indicated that it would restate profit re-
ports."'83 Charles Prestwood, a retired Enron attorney lost $1.3
million dollars, "I'm a very broke person. I lost everything I
had."'
After retiring as an Enron natural-gas plant manager in 1992,
when his eyesight failed, Mr. Maddox, now 68 years old, kept his
retirement-plan money invested entirely in Enron stock. 'I lost
$1,244,000,' says Mr. Maddox, who has other retirement income
but postponed plans to build a new house because of the loss.'
Most employees seemingly choose not to diversify - whether due
to lack of information, education about risk or employee loyalty.88
One article suggests investors choose company stock as a way of
following sound advice in buying a company they know.
18 7
180. James Flanigan & Chris Kraul, Enron Failure's Ripple Effects; Analysis: Observ-
ers say consequences could be severe for energy prices as well as banks and other investors.
Firm's trading rivals see opportunities, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at Cl,
available at 2001 WL 28932538.
181. Shim, supra note 142.
182. Id.
183. Fed In Enron Probe, supra notel68.
184. A Reaction to Enron Pension Meltdown, supra note 142.
185. Aaron Lucchetti & Theo Francis, Dangers of Note Diversifying Hit Investors -





2. The Wolves: Discriminatory Treatment
Enron executives were not as unfortunate as their employees. 18
Enron executives, not only sidestepped the lock out, but enjoyed
"elite arrangements" popular in many companies for executives to
shield assets in partnerships and trusts, shelter large amounts of
compensation from taxes and pass amounts largely tax-free to
heirs.'89
To be sure, many Enron executives lost millions of dollars they
had saved in deferred compensation plans, which are special sav-
ings plans that function much like outsize 401(k) plans for execu-
tives, when the company filed for bankruptcy-court protection on
December 2. These executives will join other unsecured creditors
in seeking to recover from Enron.
However, executive agreements filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission over the years disclose that the most senior
executives, who enjoyed more elite arrangements, were also able
to shield their special pension packages from bankruptcy and pro-
tect them from creditors by sheltering them within private part-
nerships...."'
As is common in these types of arrangements, and dissimilar to
ERISA pensions, executives can withdraw funds from, or borrow
against, the policy's cash value. 9'
These special pension plans are called "split-dollar life insur-
ance policies," in which companies pay the vast majority of the
premiums on lucrative insurance policies that benefit top execu-
tives or their families. 9 ' These policies are typically used to shel-
188. . For a complete and current discussion of the executive pension arrangements, see
also Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Accounting for Enron: Enron Pensions Had More
Room at the Top - Executives' Benefits Grew as Retirement Plans of Workers Were Cut,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3383703 Currently, a number
of executives are seeking severance pay (one for over $6 million) from the bankruptcy court.
See C. Bryson Hull, Ex-Enron Execs Seek Extra Severance Courts: Former insiders are
asking for millions in pay. Bankruptcy judge says he will rule on request this month, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at C6, available at 2002 WL 2496229.
189. Theo Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Top Executives At Enron Shield Pension Benefits,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2002, at A3, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3385283. "Last month, the
deals got a big boost when the Internal Revenue Service, at the urging of the Bush admini-
stration, employer groups and the insurance industry, backed off a proposal introduced
under the last administration to tax the insurance arrangements more heavily." Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. For an example of a split-dollar life insurance policy of J. Skilling, former CEO of
Enron, who resigned in August 2001 see
http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/enron/skilling.ins. 1997.05.23.html.
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ter executive pension benefits.'93 In a typical split-dollar arrange-
ment the company pays most of the premium -- costs it ultimately
would recoup. At the same time the executive could borrow
against this policy for a variety of uses, or leave the funds until
the executive's death for his or her heirs to recoup, largely tax-
free."" Such policies have been a popular tool for funding retire-
ment benefits for top executives, because under the most common
arrangements, executives would pay -- and be taxed on -- only a
sliver of the total premiums for the policy. The rest of the pre-
mium is paid by the employer, which later recoups its costs when
the benefits are paid out.9 '
3. How to Get Some Mortar?
The resulting picture demonstrates that the stone and mortar
financial planning to which wealthy executives are privy is un-
known to most average employees, who look to the federal gov-
ernment through ERISA for protection. Little do they know, the
protection is not applicable in certain situations. The average En-
ron employee, possibly misled by those executives who were fully
protected from damage to their own retirement funds, has a sticks
and straw pension which blew down once the wolf came blowing.
That wolf is big business and a capitalistic market most average
Americans fail to understand. That wolf is non-standard account-
ing practices, conflicted auditing and legal firms charged with the
duty of oversight, greedy executives with insight to inconsistencies
and potential collapse proselytizing the sacredness of investment
in the company. That wolf is real and although Congress once, in
193. Francis & Schultz, supra note 190.
194. Id.
195. Id. The article also explains executives can shelter retirement money other ways.
While regular employees are often loaded up with company stock in their retirement plans,
and can't diversify out of it, executives can protect themselves without selling the shares
and triggering taxes by using various hedging techniques. These include "swap" funds,
which let them swap the returns on their employers' stock for the return on a diversified
pool of securities.
Representative Richard Neal of Massachusetts, introduced a bill to rein in the use
of swap funds -- also called exchange funds - and characterized them as a tax-avoidance
scheme. The bill went nowhere... .Now, citing recent events at Enron, Mr. Neal is seeking
new co-sponsors for the bill, noting recent disclosures in The Wall Street Journal that top
Enron executives used swap arrangements to protect themselves from exposure to Enron
stock. "While the employees of Enron looked on helplessly, one director was able to use
exchange funds to hedge his bets, diversify his portfolio, and postpone taxes," Mr. Neal
wrote in a letter to his colleagues. Theo Francis & Ellen Schultz, Shelters for Executive




the rush and fury of the Studebaker aftermath, attempted to pro-
vide mortar to American retirees, Congress did not provide bricks
to seal the deal. Employees who participate in defined contribu-
tion plans remain at risk - uninsured through the PBGC and un-
protected by ERISA's fiduciary provisions if the §404(c) release
applies. Neither the IRC nor ERISA prohibited investing 100% of
401(k) in employer stock. The law failed to prohibit many devices
such as the lock out period. Furthermore, it did not prevent the
freezing of employer stock in the 401(k) for many years.
III. THE LITIGATION: EMPLOYEES' CLAIMS AND REMEDIES
AVAILABLE
Without the protection of PBGC, the only hope employees have
of recovering their losses is under ERISA's fiduciary rules. Of
course, as previously discussed, defined contribution plan holders
may have a hard time arguing fiduciary duty in light of 404(c),
and even if employees have a valid claim, they will not be made
whole because ERISA remedies are so limited. These examina-
tions are probably moot once the company slides into bankruptcy -
- as Morrison Knudsen did,'96 and Enron has -- because the bank-
ruptcy proceedings ultimately could lead a trial court to dismiss
the claim.' 7 Logically, employees would then seek to sue execu-
tives directly - but even if executives are found to have committed
some breach duty external to ERISA, their pensions cannot be
used to offset the losses. Under ERISA §206(d) antialienation
provisions, pension benefits may not be assigned or alienated un-
less the executives are found criminally liable or liable as plan
fiduciaries."'
196. See supra notes 282-286 and accompanying text for Morrison discussion.
197. Ellen E. Shultz & Theo Francis, Enron Isn't the Only Retirement Tale That Leads
to Hard Lesson: 'Diversify', WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ
3383473.
198. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4) (2001) Form and payment of benefits:
(d) Assignment or alienation of plan benefits. (1) Each pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.. .(4) Paragraph (1)
shall not apply to any offset of a participant's benefits provided under an employee
pension benefit plan against an amount that the participant is ordered or required to
pay to the plan if, - (A) the order or requirement to pay arises, - (i) under a judgment
of conviction for a crime involving such plan, (ii) under a civil judgment ... entered by
a court in an action brought in connection with a violation...of part 4 of this subtitle...
Id. See also Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection: Amending the An-
tialienation Provision of ERISA §206(d), 80 OR. L. REV. 379 (2001) (a brilliant paper discuss-
ing the antialienation provision and its limited exceptions)
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A. Civil Suits:99
1. Statutory Breach Under ERISA §1109
Campbell Harrison & Wright LLP, a Houston law firm...
filed the first case on November 13, 2001, entitled Tittle, et al
v. Enron Corp., et al. 201 A class action ERISA case, 22 it was filed
on behalf of plan participants "who were participants in or
beneficiaries of the Enron Corporation Savings Plan, 401(k), from
November 1, 2000, to the present (the Class Period) and who made
or maintained investments in Enron stock."213  On April 8, 2002,
the suit was consolidated with the multitudes of complaints2 4 into
one class action, representing 24,000 Enron employees, and ar-
gues that the defendants,2 5 breached their fiduciary duties in vio-
199. Theo Francis & Ellen Schultz, Enron Faces Suits Over Pension Plain --- Partici-
pants Suffered Losses Because of Company's Plunging Stock, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Nov. 26,
2001, at M1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29657796.
Lynn Sarko, one of Ms. Tittle's attorneys with Seattle's Keller Rohrback LLP, is
also co-lead counsel in a similar lawsuit against Lucent Technologies, Inc., Murray Hill,
New Jersey. Another firm representing Ms. Tittle is Dallon Gotto Samson & Kilgard PLC,
which is lead counsel in a similar suit against Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., Malvern, PA.
Id.
200. Id.
201. Keller Rohrback, L.L.P., Welcome to the Enron 401(k) ERISA litigation website, at
http://www.enronerisa.com.
202. http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint.html: Claim 1 - This is a civil enforcement
action brought pursuant to section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") (29 U.S.C. § 1132 (YEAR). Id.
203. Keller Rohrback, L.L.P., Welcome to the Enron 401(k) ERISA litigation website, at
http://www.enronerisa.com.
204. The suit by the Severed Enron Employees Coalition (SEEC) is included. SEEC is
an independent, volunteer organization representing over 5000 Enron employees (severed
and not). See httpJ/www.theseec.org/full_who.shtml.
205. See http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint/html. Includes Enron executives, plan
manager Northern Trust, plan administrators and administrative committees. According
to the filing, Northern Trust was a fiduciary defined under ERISA 403(a)(1) - which means
subject to the direction of Enron Administrative Committee and other fiduciaries. Admin-
istrator of the plan, according to SEC filings, was Mary K Joyce.
According to the original SEC filing, the fiduciaries include:
1) The Northern Trust Company, subsidiary of Northern Trust Corp, as trustee of
plan;
2) Northern Trust Retirement Consulting, LLC, subsidiary Northern Trust Corp, as
recordkeeper of the plan;
3) Philip J. Bazelides, Chairmen of the Administrative Committee of the Plan in
SEC filings;
4) Robert A. Belfer, Director of the Company, served on Exec and Finance Commit-
tee and Board of Directors. Received $51 million from the sale of his Enron Shares;
5) Norman P. Blake, Jr., Director of the Company, served on Finance and Compen-
sation Committees; received $1.7 million from sale of his Enron Shares;
6) Ronnie C. Chan, Director of the Company, served on Audit and Finance Commit-
tees; received $337,000 from sale of Enron shares;
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lation of ERISA § 1109206 in a variety of ways, especially in connec-
tion with the Plan's holdings of company stock,"7 when Enron and
7) John H. Duncan, Director of the Company, served on Compensation committee;
received $2 million from sale of Enron shares;
8) Lou Pai, Chairman of Enron Subsidiary; received $353,000 from sale;
9) Ken Rice, former President and CEO Enron Broadband; rec. $72 million;
10) Mark Frevert, Chairman Enron North America; $50 million;
11) Joseph Sutton, former Vice Chair Enron; $40 million;
12) Clifford Baxter, former vice Chair of Enron; $35.2 million;
13) Joseph M. Hirko, former Chief Exec. Enron Broadband; $35.1 million;
14) Richard A. Causey, former CAO; $13.3 million;
15) James V. Derrick is or was General Counsel; $12.6 million;
16) Mark E. Koenig, is or was VP and $9.1 million;
17) Cindy K Olson, VP, $6.5 million. Confirming Tuesday's congressional testimony
by Cindy Olson, a top Enron human-resources executive who also served as a 401(k)
plan trustee, Mr. Prentice said Ms. Olson didn't share information with the other
trustees about allegations she had heard about the company's financial practices;
18) Steven J. Kean, is or was Director; $5.1 million;
19) Richard B. Buy, is or was Chief Risk Officer; $4.3 million;
20) Michael S. McConnell is or was President Enron Global Markets; $2.3 million;
21) Joe H. Foy, Director; $1.6 million;
22) J. Mark Metts, is or was VP and Director; $1.4 million;
23) Stan Horton; former Chairman and CEO of Enron Transportation Services; $45
million;
24) Wendy L. Gramm; Director; Chair Commodities Futures Trading Commission;
$276,000 stock;
25) Ken L. Harrison; Director; $79 million;
26) Robert K. Jaedicke; Director; served on Compensation and Audit Committees;
$841,000;
27) Mary K. Joyce; Plan Administrator (no amount on sale of stock mentioned);
28) Kenneth L. Lay; Director and COB; CEO; $101 million;
29) Andrew Fastow; former CFO; $30.4 million;
30) Jeff McMahon; former CFO; $2.7 million;
31) Charles A. LeMaistre; Director; alleged to have served as a Chair of Compensa-
tion and Management Development Committee responsible for monitoring Com-
pany's benefit programs; $841,000;
32) Rebecca P. Mark-Jusbasche; Director; $79 million;
33) John Mendelsohn; Director; Member Board's Audit and Compliance Committee
and Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee;
34) Jerome J. Meyer; Director;
35) Paulo V. Ferraz Pereira; Director; served on Audit and Compliance Committee;
36) James S. Prentice; Chair Administrative Committee of Plan;
37) Frank Savage; Director; served on the Compensation and Management Devel-
opment Committee and responsible for monitoring Company's benefit programs;
38) Jeffery K. Skiling; Director; served as Company's President and COO; CEO; $67
million;
39) John A. Urquhart; Director; paid substantial consulting fees by Enron;
40) John Wakeham; Director; substantial consulting fees;
41) Herbert S. Winokur; Director;
42) Arthur Anderson, LLP;
43) Plan Administrative Committee Members;
available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnr/docs/enron/seecntrust012402cmp.pdf
206. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
207. http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint.html.
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executive officers were made aware of numerous practices that
made Enron's stock an inappropriate Plan investment. The fidu-
ciaries failed in their duty to disclose and inform the 401(k) par-
ticipants regarding this information. Instead they encouraged par-
ticipants and beneficiaries of the Plan to continue to make and
maintain substantial investments in the Company Stock Funds in
the Plan.0 8
Other actions include misleading employees into purchasing
and retaining company stock, creating entities which benefited
insiders; insider trading of company stock; poor policing, inade-
quate auditing practices and failure to ensure adequate diversifi-
cation or oversight of investment of the funds.2"9
Arthur Andersen is also named in the class action to answer to
allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of im-
plied and express warranties and seeks at least $600 million in
damages. 210 Law firm Vinson & Elkins also joins the list of defen-
dants, which also includes Wall Street investment banks Merrill
Lynch, JP Morgan Chase & Company, Credit Suisse First Boston,
and Citigroup (including Soloman Smith Barney).21'
The complaint refutes any §404(c) employer defense by stating
the plans never qualified under §404(c) treatment because Enron
failed to satisfy the conditions for such treatment, including range
of diversified investments, ability to transfer freely and sufficiency
of information to make such choices.2 2Generally, to prove that the
plan's administrators breached their fiduciary duties, employees
must show that the trustees knew the stock was a bad investment.
This presents a high hurdle, so it is not surprising that prior law-
suits over losses in company stock in 401(k) plans have generally
213come in the wake of allegations of accounting irregularities.
For example, prior 401(k) lawsuits, under 404(c) limitations,
have found employer liability where the employer intentionally
208. Keller Rohrback, L.L.P., Welcome to the Enron 401(k) ERISA litigation website, at
http://www.enronerias.com.
209. http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint.html, at Claim 39. The complaint also






213. Theo Francis & Ellen Shultz, Enron is Sued by 401(k) Members Amid Firm's
Plunging Stock Price, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2001.
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misleads employees.214 Importantly for the plaintiffs, once they
demonstrate 404(a) fiduciary duties owed by the defendants,
404(c) is merely a defense to such duties - and one in which the
defendants carry the burden to prove plaintiffs' control was the
cause of the loss (the essential 404(c) control provisions).215 Inci-
dentally, 404(c) will not apply if the employer materially misrep-
resented plan participants.216 Material misrepresentation requires
knowledge - meaning employers can still attempt to demonstrate
they did not know the stock was spiraling. Additionally, Courts
have concluded that a business with an ESOP can be liable for
breach of its fiduciary duty if it abuses its discretion by concealing
its financial instability and continuing to invest plan assets in
company stock, even though the business is failing.217
2. ERISA Restrictions: No Effective Sanction for Egregious
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA
Plan beneficiaries sue under § 1132(a)(2) (allowing for "appro-
priate relief' in suits brought pursuant to § 1109).2'8 Through this
provision, the first suit claims defendants are obliged to make
good to the Plan the loss it has suffered as a result of their fiduci-
ary breaches.19 The Plan is not a party to particular actions.2
Pursuant to ERISA, however, the relief requested in this action is
for the benefit of the Plan 2' allowing damages to make the plan
whole, including making good to the plan for "any losses" "restor-
214. Alves v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Mass. 2002),
available at, 2002 WL 1183593; see also Gottlieb v. SBC Communications, Inc. (filed in the
Central District of California on April 18, 2000) (the "AirTouch case") and Mehling v. New
York Life Insurance Company, 163 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (amended complaint
filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 14, 2000) (the "New York Life
case"). See: Morton A. Harris, Working With Participant Directed Investments Under
ERISA § 404(C), SGO08 ALI-ABA 887 (2001).
215. In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 1997 WL 732473, at 30 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1997).
216. See In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir. 1996)
217. See, e.g., Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995); Kuper v. Iovenko,
66 F.3d 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995). (Both cases cited did not find liability/breach. Moench
just preserved the issue, and didn't make determination B/C of incomplete record. Kuper
held that allegations were insufficient to find liability, let alone rebut presumption of rea-
sonable action.)
218. 29 U.S.C.A. §1132(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. v 2000).
219. http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint.html., at Count 105, et. seq. (Seek to recover
losses to the plan, including compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable costs, inter-
est, and injunction under ERISA 501(a)(3) and other appropriate equitable relief.). ERISA
§502(a).
220. http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint.html at Claim 14.
221. Id. Enron is the sponsor of the Plan. Its Sponsor Identification Number is 47-
0255140 and the Plan Number is 333. Id. at Claim 15.
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ing to such plan any profits" and "other equitable or remedial re-
lief as the court may deem appropriate."2
Other equitable relief has repeatedly been deemed remedies eq-
uitable and not legal in nature,223 necessarily ruling out compensa-
tory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court has determined
that the statutory language of section 1109 does not allow benefi-
ciaries "...extracontractual damages, or ... the right of action for
compensatory or punitive relief....,,4 However, the Court specifi-
cally did not hold that such relief would not be available to the
plan.
225
Courts have reasoned that the purpose of section 1109 is to
"undo harm" to the plan and not to penalize.226 A possible reason
for this limit to a contractual remedy could be that extensive expo-
sure to liability would discourage employers from offering plans at
all.22' This is an example of the age-old tension where it is thought
that over-regulation may lead to under coverage.
Because the remedy must be to the plan, valuation of the
amount of money damages is necessarily impossible, and there-
fore, leaves no adequate remedy at law. Left with only equitable
remedies, the plaintiffs will have just as difficult a time valuing
222. See 29 U.S.C.A. §1109 (1994 & Supp. V 2000);see also note 142.
223. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Ben. ERISA Litigation, 57 F.3d 1255 (3rd Cir.
1995); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1992), rehearing denied, certiorari
denied, 508 U.S. 959 (1993); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1993) (See 7th Circuit
treatment at 1992 WL 336376 at FN 4 as a reference as well as 140 F. 3d 1190, 1194.).
224. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 135 (1985).
225. Id.
226. Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, (2d Cir. 1992). The
standard measure for equitable relief is always to put the plaintiff in the position prior to
the breach or tortuous act - never to penalize. As noted in the Supreme Court decision,
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 US 390, 399 (1939), equitable relief in "ac-
cordance with the principles governing equity jurisdiction [is] not to inflict punishment but
to prevent an unjust enrichment by allowing injured complainants to claim 'that which, ex
aequo et bono, is theirs, and nothing beyond this'." (C. J. Hughes quoting Justice Daniel's
opinion in Livingston v. Woodworth, 15 How. 546, 560).
227. See Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), where the Supreme Court, while compar-
ing the common law and ERISA's proscription of fiduciary duties required in a trust rela-
tionship, determined that ERISA's fiduciary provisions may allow for other than traditional
treatment, quoting Congress,
in doing so, courts may have to take account of competing congressional purposes,
such as Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on
the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex
that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from
offering welfare benefit plans in the first place. Cf. ERISA § 2 with Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78-81, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 1228-1229, 131 L.Ed.2d
94 (1995), and Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 262-263, 113 S.Ct. 2063,
2071-2072, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993).
Id. at 497.
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the amount of restitution (or placing amounts under a construc-
tive trust) considering the loss to the plan is questionable and
based on so many arbitrary economic factors, that restoring the
plans to where each would have been but for the breach is impos-
sible.
One Second Circuit case deals with valuation of damages result-
ing from a fiduciary breach to a plan.228 Using the common law of
trusts as a guide, the court determines the damage using exam-
ples of other like investments to determine but for the breach,
what the plan would have been worth.2 9 In other words, damages
are equal to measurement by the rate of return which prior in-
vestments made by the plan fiduciary would have realized absent
the breach."'
Additionally, according to ERISA §1132, the Civil Enforcement
provision, 231 the Secretary can enforce penalty on the breaching
party equal to 20% of an applicable recovery amount for breach of
fiduciary duties. This penalty is likely in the accounting fiasco
environment and considering the public outcry to skin the wolves.
228. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 754 F.2d 1049, (2d Cir. 1985), 78 A.L.R. FED. 110(1986).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 29 U.S.C.A. §1132 (1) (1994 & Supp. V 2000), states in pertinent part:
Civil penalties on violations by fiduciaries: (1) In the case of-
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of) part 4 of
this subtitle by a fiduciary, or (B) any knowing participation in such a breach
or violation by any other person,the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty
against such fiduciary or other person in an amount equal to 20 percent of the
applicable recovery amount.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "applicable recovery amount" means any
amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or other person with respect to a breach
or violation described in paragraph (1)-
(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or (B) ordered by
a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person to a plan or its participants
and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding instituted by the Secretary under
subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5) of this section.
(3) The Secretary may, in the Secretary's sole discretion, waive or reduce the penalty
under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines in writing that-
(A) the fiduciary or other person acted reasonably and in good faith, or-(B) it
is reasonable to expect that the fiduciary or other person will not be able to re-
store all losses to the plan (or to provide the relief ordered pursuant to subsec-
tion (a)(9) of this section) without severe financial hardship unless such waiver
or reduction is granted.
(4) The penalty imposed on a fiduciary or other person under this subsection with re-
spect to any transaction shall be reduced by the amount of any penalty or tax im-
posed on such fiduciary or other person with respect to such transaction under sub-
section (i) of this section and section 4975 of Title 26.
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However, plaintiffs would unlikely collect attorney fees through
ERISA since the statute limits such relief.
22
Plaintiffs can be more certain of the likelihood of a supportive
judicial atmosphere and the odds that courts will find for them
through whatever the statute does provide. For example, in Var-
ity v. Howe, 3 the Supreme Court, considering the employer's "in-
tended communication about the security of benefits was rendered
materially misleading," held "that making intentional representa-
tions about the future of plan benefits in that context is an act of
plan administration."2 "4
In Varity, the employer shifted employees to a new plan under a
new employer, with the promise of security to those funds, all the
while knowing the shift would relieve the employer from an ex-
pensive responsibility to the employees and lead to extreme loss to
the beneficiary-employees. 5 As a result of the employer's fraudu-
lent and misleading claims, the plaintiffs lost significant bene-
fits. 26 Although the case dealt with a welfare benefit plan,237 the
Court's determination that the employer's misleading or fraudu-
lent statements which damaged the plan were considered a breach
of fiduciary duty as "administrator"231 lends support to the Enron
employees' argument where executives touted Enron stock as a
wise and fiscally responsible investment, to benefit personally
from employee investment, all the while knowing it was a rotten
egg."' The Court stated: "To participate knowingly and signifi-
cantly in deceiving a plan's beneficiaries in order to save the em-
ployer money at the beneficiaries' expense is not to act 'solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries' under ERISA
404(a)."
240
232. ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).




237. Id. See infra note 129 for explanation of "welfare benefit plan." ERISA covers
such plans, which include medical and vacation funds.
238. Varity, 516 U.S. at 494. In Varity, the Supreme Court noted that the District
Court held that Varity and Massy-Ferguson "violated an ERISA imposed fiduciary obliga-
tion to administer Massey-Ferguson's benefit plan 'solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries' of the plan. ERISA §404(a)." Id.
239. See infra notes 122-153 and accompanying text and timeline in Appendix 1.
240. Varity, 516 U.S. at 506. See also Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983) ([l]ying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty
owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a)(1) of ERISA.); Central States, South-
east and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S., 559, 570-571
(1985) (ERISA fiduciary duty includes common-law duty of loyalty); BOGERT & BOGERT, LAW
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B. Criminal Charges: Remedies and Evidence of Wrongdoing
The criminal investigations may lead to not only penalties
against plan fiduciaries, but may bring more evidence of a breach
of duty for the civil cases. Successful criminal prosecutions of
some executives can provide relief from the anti-alienation rules
that shield plan accounts.
Under ERISA §1131, fiduciaries may be subject, in light of what
the harm is, to light criminal penalties:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of part 1 of
this subtitle, or any regulation or order issued under any such
provision, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; except that in
the case of such violation by a person not an individual, the
fine imposed upon such person shall be a fine not exceeding
$100,000.41
Of course, other Federal and State statutes cover other criminal
charges, however, the SEC does not "always bring criminal
charges against a corporation's highest officials ... because crimi-
nal violation of securities laws requires proof that a person acted
'willfully and knowingly' to make false representations to regula-
tors or the public.",
4
1
Possible criminal charges exist for what the SEC terms "the
pump and dump," where a company, "knowingly creating or
promulgating a series of untrue statements designed to juice a
stock to a higher level than it normally would go (the pump) with
the intention of selling shares in the ensuing frenzy (the dump)."24 '
Investigators may view the lockout as suspect and circumstantial
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 218-219 (duty of loyalty requires trustee to deal fairly and
honestly with beneficiaries); 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, LAW OF TRUSTS § 170, pp. 311-312
(same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (same)."). See also: Fischer v. Philadelphia
Electric, 994 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("Put simply, when a plan administrator speaks, it
must speak truthfully."). However the duty to speak truthfully does not include "clairvoy-
ance."
241. ERISA §1131. Since amended by The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002). See infra note 344-45: increasing ERISA § 501
criminal penalties from one year imprisonment and/or a $5,000 individual ($100,000 corpo-
rate entity) fine to a ten year imprisonment and/or a $100,000 individual ($500,000 corpo-
rate entity) fine; and prevention of audit accounting firm non-audit services. Id.
242. Michael Orey, Top Enron Officials May Avoid Criminal Charges, WALL ST. J. Feb.
12, 2002, at A6, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3385673.
243. Cramer, supra note 175.
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evidence of such a pump and dump because of the suspicious tim-
* 244ing.
More evidence of wrongdoing was discovered in March, as finan-
cial statements, memoranda and other business papers became
open to public scrutiny. In 2000, "the very time, investigators now
say, when corporate officials were improperly inflating the com-
pany's profits by as much as a billion dollars," Enron paid its ex-
ecutives huge bonuses48 for hitting stock price targets.246 Accord-
ing to Stephen Meagher, a former federal prosecutor who handled
white-collar cases and who now represents whistle-blowers, "[a]
strong financial motive is probably the best evidence a prosecutor
can get to promote or to establish criminal intent .... The levels of
compensation that we are talking about here would certainly seem
to be a powerful incentive for anyone to do anything." 7
Currently, investigators have little or "no evidence that anyone
in government did anything improper as the firm spiraled down-
ward."2 48 Investigators are also unsure if Enron did anything in-
herently illegal. 9
That's partly because nobody can be sure that those dodges were
inherently illegal. Many companies maintain similar arrange-
ments, usually intended to avoid taxes--a benefit of interest to En-
ron too. Enron avoided paying federal income tax for four out of
the last five years and instead received millions of dollars in fed-
eral-tax refunds. 5 °
However, even if Enron is deemed on the proper side of the law
in its accounting practices and corporate structure, other activities
affecting shareholders - especially employee-shareholders - are
likely to provide plenty of firepower to support causes of action for
misrepresentation, fraud, statutory and common law breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence, insider trading and others under a
number of Federal statutes - including, and most importantly for
discussion here, ERISA.
244. See infra notes 155-179 and accompanying text.
245. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: Executive Compensation; Enron Paid
Huge Bonuses in '01; Experts See a Motive for Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at Al,




248. Scherer & Francis, supra note 172.
249. The FBI, however, based upon findings, is filing suit for related NatWest fraudu-
lent activity. See: US v. Mulgrew available at:
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enronlusmulgrew62702aff.pdf.
250. Duffy, et.al., supra note 152.
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C. State Law Remedies & Sanctions for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty
Generally, ERISA preempts state law regulation of pensions
and retirement plans. 5' State claims of breach of fiduciary duty,
intentional and negligent misrepresentation and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing will likely be seen as "re-
lated to" the plan and therefore preempted by ERISA.252
However, state law claims against corporate executives for
breach of corporate fiduciary duties, and auditing / accounting
firms and legal firms (like Vinkins & Elkins) for breach of non-
fiduciary duties will arguably not be preempted as not related to
ERISA.253 Although these particular defendants could avoid
ERISA fiduciary breach claims, they may be exposed to legal mal-
practice and other state law claims.
D. The Effects of the Bankruptcy on the Suits and Remedies
One must remember, although the class actions are seeking re-
lief under ERISA §1109 for money damages, it is very unlikely any
money will be available from which to pay damages. "By law,
workers' claims against Enron are secondary to its obligations to
banks and other secured creditors."254  The bankruptcy filing as-
sures that the employees' claim will be limited to whatever money
may be available. 55 Realistically, it looks as if nothing will be
available. Furthermore, according to Michael McConnell, a former
U.S. bankruptcy judge and current shareholder at Winstead,
Sechrest & Minick, "[t]he question of whether there will be assets
to distribute and, if so, how they will be distributed, won't be de-
251. 29 U.S.C.A. §1144 (1994 & Supp. V. 2000), provides in pertinent part:
a) Supersedure; effective date Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee bene-
fit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
Id.
252. Crumley v. Stonhard, Inc., 920 F.Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1996), affd 106 F.3d 384 (3rd Cir.
1996); Cox v. Eichler, 765 F.Supp. 601 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
253. Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986), rehearing denied 797 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied 479 U.S. 1034 (1987), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1089 (1987).
254. Adam Geller, Enron Workers Seek $1 Billion for Failed 401(k) Plans, Say Bank-
ruptcy No Excuse, ASSOCIATE PRESS, Feb. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/redesign/apenron.html. See also 11 U.S.C. §507 (2002).
255. Geller, supra note 254.
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cided for some time. '256 Once available, if at all, legal experts ex-
pect the fight for these small amounts of assets will be vicious.
25 7
In the bankruptcy pecking order, secured creditors - such as
banks holding collateral on loans - are essentially first in line.
Next come unsecured creditors whose claims are arranged in order
of priority. U.S. law gives a high priority to employees' claims for
up to $ 4,300 in wages and benefits, for example. The sum offers
little consolation to employees who have lost their jobs and
watched hundreds of thousands of dollars in company stock
evaporate from retirement accounts, experts said. 'Employees are
just like every other shareholder - at the back of a very long line,'
said Corey Rosen, executive director at the National Center for
Employee Ownership in Burbank, Calif. 'They are common stock-
holders in the position of any other common stockholder, which
ain't good.' 258
As of May 2002, Enron Corporation's Chief Executive Stephen
F. Cooper, estimated the company may be able to recover 40% of
the over $50 billion owed to creditors.2 9
The bankruptcy will provide a stay against the employees seek-
ing immediate remedy against Enron over lost pensions.260 How-
ever, lawsuits by Enron employees that challenge the fiduciaries'
treatment of 401(k) accounts by executives, will go forward even if
Enron is in bankruptcy, said attorney Lynn Sarko of Keller Rohr-
back, a Seattle law firm bringing one of the suits on behalf of em-
ployees.2 6' According to Sarko, "[t]here is still liability faced by fi-
duciaries, officials who were administrators of the savings plan
and by the companies that insured it." '262 These employees re-
ceived a boost when an "official committee to focus on the issues
relating to (Enron) employees" was appointed by U.S. Bankruptcy
Court Trustee Carolyn Schwartz.263
256. Charlene Oldham, Enron's fall promises a legal mess; 'There is nothing to compare




259. Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Discloses Recovery Target for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
May 6, 2002, at C15, available at WL-WSJ 3393905.
260. See Enron Complaint, supra note 144, at count 43.
261. Flanigan & Kraul, supra note 180.
262. Id.
263. Former Enron Employees Win Place at Bankruptcy: U.S. Trustee Grants Request by
Severed Enron Employees Coalition, Press Release, Severed Enron Employees Coalition,
SEEC.org, available at www.theseec.org/press/02152002pressrelease.shtml.
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In the interest of maximizing the bankruptcy estate, lawyers
searching for assets are "locking onto $435 million of insurance
meant to protect the company and top officials during lawsuits."6
One of which is fiduciary liability coverage worth $85 million and
"is supposed to settle claims arising from the alleged mismanage-
ment of benefit programs--in this case, the 401(k) plan that de-
stroyed the savings of many Enron employees."265 Unfortunately
for the former employees, insiders claim most of those proceeds, if
payable at all, will be paid to Enron's defense attorneys."' Fur-
thermore, considering the current charges of misrepresentations
in seeking coverage many insurers are considering refusing to pay
anything at all.267 Plaintiffs suing over the 401(k) damages, asked
the bankruptcy court to set that $85 million aside to help make
them whole. 8 Enron requested $30 million of that plan be ad-
vanced to them to cover defense costs for directors and managers,
but litigants are not having that. To prevent such a distribution,
states and litigants petitioned the bankruptcy court.269 These
claimants were likely pleased when the bankruptcy court denied
Enron access to the funds.27°
As a result of the bankruptcy, the Labor Department ensured in
an agreement with Enron, the appointment of an independent fi-
duciary to manage the retirement plans.27' Enron has since agreed
to payment for the new fiduciary manager.2 7 2
264. John Keilman, No assurance of Enron insurance payouts: Some firms try to void





269. Thirty-three states seek to block Enron aid to executives, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 23,
2002, available at 2002 WL 14993696. Oregon and New Mexico were joined in the request by
attorneys general from Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
270. Christopher Oster, Questioning the Books: Judge Says That Insurers Should Decide
if Enron Lawyers Get Insurance, WALL ST. J. , Feb. 28, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WL-
WSJ 3387306.
271. DOL News Release: Sue Hensley, Labor Secretary Chao Announces Agreement
To Replace Enron Pension Plan Officials, Independent Fiduciary Will Assume Management
of Retirement Plans, OPA NEWS RELEASE, Feb. 13, 2002, at
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/opa2002089.htm.
272. Enron Agrees to Retirement Fees, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 31, 2002, at 2002 WL
21842012.
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"At this time, the (pension) plans are ongoing under (Enron)
company sponsorship," a spokesman for the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., a federal agency that insures pensions, said
Thursday.273 In conjunction with petitions for Chapter 11 reor-
ganization, Enron asked the Bankruptcy Court to consider a vari-
ety of "first day motions" to support its employees, vendors, trad-
ing counterparties, customers and other constituents. These in-
cluded motions seeking court permission to continue payments for
employee payroll and health benefits. 74 The bankruptcy court ap-
proved all first day, including:
Payment of pre-petition and post-petition employee wages,
salaries, business expenses and benefits, including medical,
for current employees, during the company's voluntary re-
structuring under Chapter 11; and approval for immediate
use of the first $250 million of the proceeds of the debtor-in-
possession (DIP) funds to continue operations, pay employee
salaries and wages, and fulfill post-petition vendor obliga-
tions. The Court also approved an initial payment of $4,500
for each employee who might become severed.275
In a related development aimed at preserving value in its North
American wholesale energy trading business, Enron said that it is
in active discussions with various leading financial institutions to
provide credit support for, recapitalize and revitalize that business
under a new ownership structure. It is anticipated that Enron
would provide the new entity with traders, back office capabilities
and technology from Enron's North American wholesale energy
business, and that the new entity would conduct counterparty
transactions through EnronOnline, the company's existing energy
trading platform. Any such arrangement would be subject to the
approval of the Bankruptcy Court. 76
273. Shim, supra note 142.
274. Enron Press Release, supra note 173.
275. Enron Receives Approval of First Day Orders, Press Release, Mark A. Palmer,
Dec. 3, 2001 available at www.enron.com.
276. Enron Press Release, supra note 173.
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IV. WARNING SIGNS
A. Earlier Incidents of Pension Loss
Equity Funding, an insurance firm based in Los Angeles that
went bankrupt in 1973;277 Cendant Corporation went bankrupt
and cost investors billions.278 Lucent, Waste Management, Xerox -
all had devastating stock declines which "hammered" employees'
401k plans.27 9 Other companies have 401k assets similarly in-
vested in a high percentage of company stock.28° Causes of action
via ERISA were hardly successful.
"Morrison Knudsen, a Boise, Idaho engineering and construc-
tion company filed for bankruptcy protection in June 1996." Dur-
ing the court battle, "the Morrison Knudsen employees have re-
ceived no compensation for company stock-related losses in their
retirement and employee stock-ownership plans."2 1 Morrison
Knudsen stock suffered an Enron-type loss in 1994 and slid over
$22 to $2 on the day it announced its bankruptcy filing.282 The
401(k) and ESOP at Morrison Knudsen, like Enron, matched with
company stock and required holding shares until employees were
in their fifties.283 In 1997, employees began to file against the
company alleging breach of fiduciary duty to plan participants for
failure to inform about true financial straits.84
In November 1999, the federal district court in Boise ruled that
Morrison Knudsen's 1996 bankruptcy reorganization plan had
released the company's officers and directors from any obligations
to the employees, and also had discharged the company's obliga-
tions to the plan.... The court didn't dismiss claims against the
trustees in the pending case, because they weren't debtors.285
277. Scherer & Francis, supra note 169.
278. Id.
279. Kadlec, supra note 98.
280. This includes: Coke - 81%; McDonald's, Procter & Gamble, and Texas Instru-
ments - over 70% See Appendix 4 for a list of companies with high percentage of employer
stock in plans.
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Color Tile, a national retail chain,286 also went bankrupt after
pressuring employees to increase investment in company stock.287
ColorTile Inc. employees lost their 401(k) savings in 1996, because
the Fort Worth, Texas, company invested 82% of the money in
stores that held ColorTile leases. The employees sued and ob-
tained a settlement of $4 million - $3.1 million from plan trustee
Texas Commerce Bank NA and $950,000 from Texas Pacific In-
demnity Co., under a fiduciary liability insurance policy .... a pit-
tance compared with a total of $34 million in the plan. 8
In 1999, Cendant employees brought suit claiming fiduciary
breach and securities fraud.288 They were unable to carry a securi-
ties fraud claim because they lacked standing.29 ° The fiduciary
breach claim failed because the plan, a stock-bonus plan, was not
ERISA-qualified."'
Employees continue to file even in light of the struggle to sub-
stantiate claims. More recently, Lucent and Ikon Office Solutions
"allege that then-current plan trustees kept offering company
stock in the plan despite knowing of serious business problems
that would hurt the stock price. Representatives for Ikon and Lu-
cent say their companies didn't require employees to invest in the
company stock, and educated employees about the need for diver-
sification."292
Lucent employees reported that during their 15-day lockdown in
October of 2000 the company's stock took a 32% "nosedive.""'
Employees are suing in what is considered the "landmark" case for
286. Shultz & Francis, supra note 197. History: How Enron workers will fare is any-
one's guess. Employees sometimes prevail in such suits - to a degree. ColorTile Inc. em-
ployees lost their 401(k) savings in 1996, because the Fort Worth, Texas, company invested
82% of the money in stores that held ColorTile leases. The employees sued and obtained a
settlement of $4 million - $3.1 million from plan trustee Texas Commerce Bank NA and
$950,000 from Texas Pacific Indemnity Co., under a fiduciary liability insurance policy.
That was a pittance compared with a total of $34 million in the plan. Id.
287. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
288. Shultz & Francis, supra note 197.
289. McLaughlin v. Cendant Corporation, et al., 76 F.Supp.2d 539, (N.J. 1999).
290. Id.
291. Id. Participants should be able to sue under state fraud or fiduciary law as
ERISA's preemption will not apply. Id.
292. Francis & Shultz, supra note 213.
293. Joann S. Lublin, Does Rank Have Too Much Privilege? As Firms Crumbled, Some
CEOs Got Payouts, Lucent, Kmart, Enron, Others Forgave Loans, Gave Stock And Paid
Lavish Severance, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at A6; See Danny Hakim, Former
Workers at Lucent See Nest Eggs Vanish, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2001, at Al; Christine
Dugas, Shaky 401(k) Plans Need Shoring Up; Workers Lament Dropping Markets, Collaps-
ing Firms, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 2001, at B1.
Fall 2002 117
Duquesne Law Review
executives misleading employees to invest in employer's stock,294
claiming executives continued to push sale and matching contri-
butions in company shares while knowing serious business prob-
lems would decimate the worth.29 One employee reports his
401(k) once worth over $800,000 is now worth $58,000.216 Keeler
Rohrback LLP, one of the firms representing Enron employees, is
lead counsel for Lucent employees in the New Jersey suit which
alleges: "that Lucent breached its fiduciary duties of loyalty, pru-
dence, and prudent diversification [of retiree] assets by failing to
disclose to plan participants and beneficiaries information indicat-
ing that Lucent stock was not a prudent stock...
IKON is facing employee suit in Pennsylvania.298 Also recently,
Xerox employees claimed in their June 2002 class action suit,
Patti v. Xerox, "Xerox" as a fiduciary, failed to make appropriate
disclosures, failed to ensure prudent investment and, "knew or
should have known about the numerous questionable and poten-
tially unlawful practices that made Xerox's stock an inappropriate
plan investment."299
Other 401(k) plan holders have filed similar breach of fiduciary
duty lawsuits: Zafarano v. Nortel Networks,"' In re Providian,3'
Zeigler v. Williams Companies,"2 and Rambo v. Worldcom Inc.3 '
Global Crossing, who also under SEC investigation and filed for
bankruptcy protection in January, made similar poor representa-
tions to employees while caring for executive's salaries and pen-
sions.0 4 The employees' fiduciary breach suit"5 alleges: "that the
294. Keller Rohrback, LLP litigation site available at:
www.erisafraud.com/news/lucentnews_01dec2001.html (quoting Russ Banham, "Dear
Prudence: Offering Company Stock in Employee 401(k)s May Not Always be Wise. Just ask
Lucent", CFO MAG., Dec. 01, 2001, available at
http://www.cfo.com/printarticle/0,5317,5989,00.html).
295. Lublin, supra note 294.
296. Keller Rohrback, LLP, supra note 295.
297. Id.
298. Whetman v. IKON, filed by Dalton Gotto Samson & Kilgard PLC, is apparently in
settlement negotiations, available at http'J/www.dgsk.com.
299. Complaint available at http://www.erisafraud.com/xerox/complaint.finallkd.pdf,
Claim 45.
300. Filed in Tennessee District Court, available at
www.erisafraud.com/pdf/Nortel.Complaint.
301. Filed in Northern District of California, available at
www.providianfinancialsuit.com/pdf/consolidatedProvidianComplaint.pdf
302. Filed in April 2002 in Northern District of Okalahoma, available at
http://erisafraud.com/pdf/williams-april2002-complaint.pdf
303. Filed June 2002 in the Southern District of Mississippi.
304. See Global Crossing article, at, The Washington Post, Sunday, Feb. 24, 2002,
available at http://www.washtech.com/news/regulation/15325-l.html; See also: Lublin,
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defendants may have withheld and concealed material informa-
tion, thereby encouraging participants and beneficiaries to con-
tinue to make and maintain substantial investments in company
stock and the Plans. 6
B. A Synopsis - Pinpointing Where to Trowel Mortar
Critics point to a number of problems with 401(k) defined con-
tribution plans as cause for alarm about the future of American
retirement. Most concerns support the contention that "they are
just too risky for use in retirement planning."37 These risks are
exacerbated since most 401(k) investors cannot afford to invest a
percentage of their incomes into the plans and do not have the
experience or knowledge to manage the assets once they are
shifted into the plan."'
In brief, employee investors: 1) do not invest the recommended
amount;0 9 2) do not understand how to manage their invest-
ments;1 0 3) do not diversify and often blindly invest too heavily in
employer stock; ' 4) overestimate the return at retirement;"' 5)
tend to spend accrued amounts when changing jobs instead of roll-
ing amounts over into IRAs or such plans.3 Additionally, payout
of 401(k) at retirement is often in a lump sum that can be squan-
dered unlike amounts paid from a defined benefit plan through an
annuity or other such controlled plan. 4
supra note 294. (""We were lied to all along," says James Welch, a 55-year-old switching
technician for a Global Crossing unit sold last summer. Mr. Welch's 401(k) account then
held 6,200 Global Crossing shares valued at about $190,000. Last week, those shares were
valued at $336. "I was always brought up to look up to upper management. But there's no
more trust," he fumes."). Id.
305. Ramkissoon v. Winnick, is a class action suit that was filed in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division, on behalf of partici-
pants and beneficiaries.
306. Keller Rohrback files Global Crossing suit, available at
www.erisafraud.com/globalcrossing/gx press-feb2002.html.
307. Statement of Jonathan Skinner, Ph.D Economics, supra note 58.
308. Statement of Karen D. Friedman, Director of Policy Strategies, Pension Rights
Center, supra note 11.
309. Statement of Jonathan Skinner, Ph.D Economics, supra note 58. According to
experts, one half of 401(k) plans, even during the bull market, had less than $12,000 ac-
crued. Statement of Karen D. Friedman, Director of Policy Strategies, Pension Rights
Center, supra note 11.
310. Statement of Jonathan Skinner, Ph.D Economics, supra note 58.
311. Id.
312. Perry, supra note 58.; Statement of Jonathan Skinner, Ph.D Economics, supra
note 58.
313. Statement of Jonathan Skinner, Ph.D Economics, supra note 58.
314. Id.
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However, an economic study presented to Congress found de-
fined contribution plans will not definitively provide less adequate
retirement than defined benefit plans, and in fact, synthetic
analysis demonstrates higher yields from defined contribution
plans."5 If this finding is true, defined contribution plans should
not be eliminated but better tailored to correct the inherent prob-
lems within them. 16
C. A Collapse Heard Around the World
As stated, the problems with defined contribution are not new
but have not been definitively addressed. With all the many ear-
lier incidents, one wonders whether any change will be affected
even now. Unlike earlier incidents post-Studebaker, however, En-
ron has captured the world's attention. This is the level of atten-
tion in which change may be required. This time, individual em-
ployees lost but many sophisticated entities also fell prey. "In to-
tal, the New York City pension funds claim a loss of $109 million
from Enron-related investments, while the Florida State Board
claims losses of $334 million. 31 7
A class action was filed on October 22, 2002 against Enron and
its officers on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased
shares of Enron common stock. Plaintiffs include the Florida State
Board of Administration, New York City Pension Funds, The
State Retirement Systems Group, the Archdiocese of Milwaukee
Supporting Fund Inc., and Amalgamated Bank of New York,
which manages pension funds that hold Enron stock."8
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania lost $16.8 million on Enron
stock Investments."9 These losses represent about 0.17% of the
investments made by the department with money from the gen-
eral fund, the tax stabilization fund, motor license fund, the tui-
tion account program and the short term investment pool ...
Enron's collapse cost the Pennsylvania Public School Employees'
$59 million in investment losses. The Pennsylvania State Em-
315. Id.
316. Very possibly, defined contribution plans should fulfill their intended purpose - as
supplementary to defined benefit plans. See infra notes 75-101 and accompanying text.
317. Kathy Chu, Enron Internal Probe Report May Be Released Next Week, Dow JONES
ENERGY SERVICE, Jan. 30, 2002.
318. Susanne Pagano, Fiduciary Responsibility: Lead Plaintiffs to be Chosen in Suits
Seeking Recovery of Enron Pension Funds, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 319 (Jan. 29,
2002).
319. Phil. Inquirer Business News in Brief PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan. 30, 2002, at C3, available at 2002
WL 4558792.
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ployees' Retirement System lost $10 million when Enron stock fell
from a high of more than $90 a share to less than 50 cents a
share.2 °
Additionally, Attorney General Mike Fisher said he would
consider suing Enron on behalf of the pension funds.32'
The "Attorneys General in Georgia, Ohio and Washington
have asked a federal court in Texas to make them the lead
plaintiffs in existing investors' securities fraud litigation."
322
Agencies overseeing pension funds in Florida, New York City
and the university pension fund in California have also
sought to lead the action.323 New Jersey will join in the class
action since its public employees' pension fund lost $61 mil-
lion in 2001 after Enron's stock plummeted from more than
$80 per share to $1 per share.324 Some state representatives
are hopeful that the loss would not prompt the state to seek
taxpayers' assistance to supplement the pension fund, as the
Pennsylvania school employees' pension fund and other
states pension funds have done.325 Compared to Florida's loss
320. Id. However, "Pennsylvania's losses were smaller than those of Florida, which lost
$335 million, and New York, which lost $115 million. New Jersey's pension system lost an
estimated $61 million." Amy Worden, Pennsylvania Treasury examines Enron investment:
A hearing was held to determine how safeguards didn't prevent a $90 million loss of tax-
payers' cash, PHIL. INQUIRER, Feb. 20, 2002, at C2 available at 2002 WL 4560969.
321. The Philadelphia Inquirer Business News in Brief, supra note 319. As of February
2002, Pennsylvania still reported its intention to join the class action suit. See Worden,
supra note 320.
Citing high diversification and a fully funded state, Pennsylvania sources maintain that
"the public employee pension funds of the state of Pennsylvania ... remain healthy" as of
May 2002. See Jeffrey Cohen, State, Count, City Pensions in Good Shape Despite Slump,
PITT. POST-GAZETrE, May 28, 2002, at B3, available at 2002 WL 21872710 (citing high
diversification and fully funded state).
322. Robert Tanner, States Join to Sue Enron, Andersen Over Pension Loss, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 2002, at A7, available at 2002 WL 3788594.
323. Id.
The money lost varies widely--$300 million in Florida retirement funds, $127 million
in Georgia, $35 million in Arizona. Rhode Island lost only $4.7 million after wisely-
or luckily-selling all of its Enron stock in early August, said Treasurer Paul J. Ta-
vares, the Chairman of the state's retirement system. The lost money, like the $103
million gone in Washington state, needs to be seen in perspective, said James Parker,
director of Washington's investment board, where the fund total $54 billion.
Id.
324. Anthony S. Twyman, Enron cost state fund for workers $61 million - But official




of more than $320 million and New York City's loss of more
than $100 million, New Jersey was relatively fortunate.326
The prognosis for the success of these claims is not opti-
mistic considering recent Third and Tenth Circuit decisions
which indicating that claims for fraud in order to recover
pension assets from a bankrupt company will probably "go
nowhere."327 Under Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
claims such as these are subordinated to other creditors
claims, as equity always is subordinated to debt.3 8 However,
the states, unlike individual employees, have their taxing
authority to assist in making up the difference. This may
not be the most politically expedient solution, but may bring
more attention even from those whose plans were not at all
affected. The possibility is real that the incredible number of
baby-boomers about to retire with less than sufficient pen-
sions will affect tax payers by creating a new welfare-retiree
population.
In any event, the shockwaves from the Enron collapse
brought the media running, and although the extensive dam-
age resulting from the collapse is nothing to celebrate,
perhaps the vast amount of those affected has finally
brought some needed attention to the pension gaps.
326. Id.
327. Kenneth W. Irvin & William McCarron, Proving fraud may not be much solace for
investors: Shareholders' efforts to recover from Enron, Global Crossing,. PENSIONS & INV.,
May 27, 2002, at 14, available at 2002 WL 9530901 See
Baroda Hill Investments Ltd. vs. Telegroup Inc., 281 F.3d 133 (3rd Cir. 2002); Al-
len v. Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2002).
Both the Baroda Hill Investments and the Allen decisions follow the reasoning of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which is presiding
over those bankruptcies. In its decision in In re Granite Partners LP, the bankruptcy
court noted that 20 years earlier, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had "counseled
suspicion with good reason whenever an investor in an insolvent entity attempts to
step up to the level of creditor," and warned that in such instances, the "investor dis-
regards the absolute priority rule." Based on that reasoning, the court subordinated
investor claims based on fraudulent misrepresentations that induced them to retain
their investments.
Irvin & McCarron, supra note 327.
328. Irvin & McCarron, supra note 327.
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V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Investigation
A poll conducted by Harris Interactive Inc. and Business Week
on January 24, 2002, reflected:
Almost three fourths of all Americans . . . believe that the
government should regulate companies' retirement plans
more closely to prevent "future Enron-like debacles. . . ." Sev-
enty-three percent of respondents said the government should
regulate company retirement plans, and 79 percent said they
think executives at large companies put their own personal
interests ahead of workers and shareholders. 2
Some experts, such as David Certner, director of economic is-
sues at AARP have expressed the view that Congress should enact
legislation to prevent employees from jeopardizing their retire-
ment futures by stockpiling company stock in 401(k) accounts.330
According to Certner, "It's clear that many people don't fully un-
derstand the risk of employer stock."33' Others, such as Ted
Benna, author of Tips for Successfully Managing Your 401(k), feel
that is unlikely to occur.33 Benna cites Congress' "reluctance to
tamper with the rights of individuals to do what they want with
their investments," as the prime reason for this opinion. 3 He-also
points out that since matching contributions are voluntary, moves
to limit company stock could make some employers decide to re-
duce or eliminate matching contributions.334
As a result of the Enron collapse, President Bush directed the
Treasury, Labor, and Commerce departments to analyze current
pension rules and regulations and "come up with recommenda-
tions of how to reform the system to make sure that people are not
exposed to losing their life savings as the result of a bank-
ruptcy. 03 1 In response, Secretary of Labor Elaine L. Chao re-
329. Enforcement: Most Americans Support More Regulation of Retirement Plans After
Enron's Collapse, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, No. 5, at 299 (Jan. 29, 2002). The poll
had a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points. Id.





335. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
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ported that task force on retirement security will present a pack-
age of regulatory reforms to the president.336
According to senior Treasury officials, the Treasury Department
task force's main objective will be to review "pension laws govern-
ing diversification, education, and lockouts, and trying to equate
the level of investment risk that management and employees have
to ensure there is no excessive risk borne by employees." 37 The
U.S. Labor Department's Pension and Welfare Benefits Admini-
stration will investigate to determine if "the company broke any
federal laws in freezing employee 401(k) accounts even as com-
pany stock prices plummeted."3 1 "The Labor Department investi-
gation is being closely coordinated with the Securities and Ex-




According to Chao, "[t]he Labor Department's review of pension
rules will focus on the lockout period during which employees are
unable to reallocate tax code Section 401(k) plans." 40 Although
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not cover
lockouts, Ann L. Combs, assistant secretary of labor for the de-
partment's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration has
stated that, "the agency will investigate the issue under ERISA's
fiduciary responsibility provisions."3 41 According to Combs, "if a
plan sponsor used the lockout to 'mask some other event' it would
be possible that the lockout period was a breach of ERISA.1
42
B. A Motley Array of Proposed Legislation: the Politilization of
Retirement Savings Plans
Enron-related reform legislation bills flooded Congress post-
Enron, and although members acted upon some, bipartisanship,
corporate lobbying and other more imminent concerns relating to
336. Fiduciary Responsibility: Labor, Treasury Reviewing Pension Rules; Enron-
Related Legislation Introduced, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, No. 5, at 297 (Jan. 29,
2002).
337. Id.
338. Fed In Enron Probe, supra note 168. See also: Labor Opens ERISA Investigation
of Enron Assistance to Dislocated Workers Also Begins Today, Press Release, Office of
Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, Jan. 31, 2002, available at http://www.dol.gov.
(Enron employees with questions about their employee benefit plans can also call the De-
partment's Pension and Welfare Benefit Administration's Dallas office at 214-767-6831).
339. Id.




Enron: Final Straw and Pensions of Brick
September 11th forced members from further action.343 Recent
legislation signed by President Bush on July 30, 2002 that regu-
lates corporate accounting3" will directly affect pension plans by
requiring a 30-day notice to investors of lockout periods; banning
executive trading during lockout periods; increasing ERISA §501
criminal penalties from one year imprisonment and/or a $5,000
individual ($100,000 corporate entity) fine to a ten year impris-
onment and/or a $100,000 individual ($500,000 corporate entity)
fine; and preventing audit accounting firms from performing non-
341audit services.
While Americans wait, they can peruse the Senate Investigatory
Report" and scrutinize proposals which have watered down to one
engrossed House bill awaiting review in the Senate47 and one
Senate bill waiting for its own consideration.34 Thus far, solutions
to the Enron pension debacle are directed at a number of issues
including restrictions on stock trading during lockouts and related
concerns, diversification requirements to prevent unreasonably
high exposure in employer stock either through diversification
restrictions or no limits on employer stock holdings, the offering of
advice or education programs for all investors while preserving
402(c); and an amendment to the ERISA remedies for fiduciary
breach provisions.
1. The Forerunners: The President and the House - What
the Republicans Offer
Responding swiftly to the Enron pension mess, President Bush
drafted legislative proposals ultimately embraced under the Re-
343. William Neikirk, Andersen: The Fallout; Reform Bill Resurgence is Expected, CHI.
TRIB., June 18, 2002, at B1, available at 2002 WL 2666525.
344. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002), H.R. 3763, 107th
Cong. (2002). (Introduced by Rep. Michael Oxley. HR3763 largely incorporated HR3762).
See supra note 358.
345. Id.
346. The 61-page Senate Report Appears (in a PDF file), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/senpsi70802rpt.pdf. The report concludes that
Enron executives were guilty of fiduciary failure, were guilty of using high-risk accounting
methods, had inappropriate conflicts of interest, had extensive "undisclosed off-the books"
activities, had excessive executive compensation, and had a lack of board independence due
to financial ties with the company (including conflict of interest of Arthur Anderson Ac-
counting). The report recommends stronger oversight and more requirements for inde-
pendence.
347. H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002). See infra note 358 and accompanying text.
348. S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002). See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
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publican-controlled House bill. 49 The president's proposal in-
cluded allowing employees to sell company-contributed stock after
three years and a restriction on sale of executive stock during
lockouts. The president's plan is more limited than the approach
advocated by some Democrats in Congress... but was applauded by
business groups, which have been pressing the administration not
to impose expensive new regulatory burdens on employees. 51
"However, retirement-plan experts say any significant change will
be an uphill battle, as employer groups, Republicans, and the
Bush administration oppose an overhaul - in particular, any lim-
its on company stock in retirement plans."352
Tax consultants say the Bush administration has softened pro-
posed new rules, which will allow top executives to continue shel-
tering billions of dollars in pension savings. 5' Many employers
now lock workers into such shares until age 50 or later. On this
issue, there may be more opportunity for compromise, since so far,
all proposals still leave employers with the freedom to lock em-
ployees into company stock for long periods. Mr. Bush's proposal
has the weakest diversification provisions, as it exempts many
defined contribution savings plans from proposed diversification
rules, particularly ESOPs, which hundreds of large employers use.
Consequently, employers could continue to lock workers into com-
pany stock in many plans until age 55 and later. 54
The Republican-sponsored House bill, largely recommended and
supported by President Bush, represents the merger of bills spon-
sored by Education and Workforce Committee Chairman, Repre-
sentatives John Boehner and Rob Portman. This bill principally
tracks Mr. Boehner's original bill, and includes a hotly contested
measure that would let pension-plan managers offer investment
advice to plan participants. Entitled the Pension Security Act of
349. See Enron Pension & Benefit Issues: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of La-
bor) (explaining and supporting President Bush's Plan), available at 2002 WL 2010306.
350. Richard W. Stevenson & Stephen Labaton, Bush Plans 401(k) Rule Changes, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 2002, at A10, available at 2002 WL 3791786.
351. Id. "This seems to be a very measured and encouraging response," said R. Bruce
Josten, executive Vice President of Government Affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
352. Kathy Chen & Theo Francis, Enron Official Didn't Warn Workers Of 401(k) Plan
After Finding Trouble, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002.
353. Theo Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Bush Appears to Be Giving Support To Shelters
for Executive Pensions, WALL ST. J. Feb. 25, 2002.
354. Chen & Francis, supra note 355.
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2002,316 it amends the IRC and ERISA to provide for a 30-day
lockout notice, prohibition of executive trading of employer stock
during lockouts, amendment to restrictions on divesture of em-
ployer stock to allow sale three years after receipt (instead of re-
quiring holding of employer stock until retirement), and the
aforementioned removal of restrictions in ERISA and IRC for in-
vestment advice from fiduciaries.356 In contrast to that offered by
the President, the House bill would give a range of restrictions,
depending on how the company stock was acquired. The bill
passed the House with a vote of 255-163 on April 11, 2002 and was
referred to the Senate on April 15, 2002.
Consumer groups and Democrats sharply criticized the bill.
California Representative George Miller, senior Democrat on the
Education and Workforce Committee, said the House bill "actually
weakens even existing protections employees have for their re-
tirement savings."35 ' Mark Iwry, a chief pension regulator at the
Treasury Department during the Clinton and first Bush admini-
strations, expressed concern that the House bill would weaken
antidiscrimination rules. "Some workers could get less or could be
excluded from a plan." 358
2. The Senate - The Democrats' Response
The Democrat version is embraced in the Senate bill, sponsored
by Rep. Kennedy, and entitled the "Protecting America's Pensions
Act of 2002."359 The bill, now in committee, provides for 30-day
lockdown notice; restriction of lockdown time to that of "reason-
able," and includes stricter diversification requirements and
stronger legal protections for workers than the House-Boehner
bill. Importantly, the bill allows employers to offer employer stock
as an investment option or a matching contribution to plans - but
not both. The bill would require executives to notify employees
when they are "dumping company stock" and impose stiffer penal-
ties for violation of pension rights. 6° "Both business groups and
355. H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002). Engrossed in House, April 11, 2002. Referred in
Senate, April 15, 2002.
356. See the bill itself and House Passes Bush's 401(k) Reform Bill Managing 401(k)
Plans, June 1, 2002, available at2002 WL 7369741.
357. Kathy Chen, The House Is Expected to Pass Bill To Strengthen Pension Protec-
tions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2002.
358. Id.
359. S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002).
360. House Passes Bush's 401(k) Reform BillManaging 401(k) Plans, supra note 356.
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Republicans have opposed many of Kennedy's measures, saying
they are too extreme and would discourage companies from offer-
ing 401(k) plans."36'
3. Specific Advice & Additional Bills362
The most hotly-contested areas between the Republican-
controlled House and Democrat-controlled Senate, include provi-
sions for diversification requirements and offering of investment
education or advice.
4. Addressing Diversification Requirements
"During the late 1990s, many people scoffed at being diversified,
because the idea of investing in a mix of stocks, bonds and other
financial assets meant missing out on some of the soaring gains of
tech stocks."3 ' Post-Enron, people may be more realistic.
The diversification requirements offered address two areas.
First, they seek to limit the amount of employer stock held. Sec-
ond, they seek to allow or require divesture of employer stock be-
fore the standard age fifty. The major concern is diversification
requirements will either restrict or deter employers from offering
defined contribution plans - especially 401(k)s and ESOPs.
The President and the Republican House agree that diversifica-
tion should be required, but preclude ESOPs from the require-
ments and only allow divesture after 3 years, as stated above.
However, the Democrats are determined in both the House and
Senate to pass a bill providing a cap on employer stock with di-
vesture requirements attached.
The Democratic Boxer-Corzine Bill, 64 prior to Senator Ken-
nedy's submission, believed the clear forerunner, provides for
amendments to ERISA and the IRC that require a 20% cap on
employer stock to satisfy the diversification requirement 35 (not
ESOPs) and provide a restriction on forced employer stock hold-
ings until only thirty-five years of age and a reduction on the
361. Id. Ronald Brownstein, Los Angeles Times, Post-Enron reform legislation stalls,
SEAITLE TIMES, May 29, 2002, at A6, available at 2002 WL 3901084.
362. For a discussion on expert recommendations, see: Statement of Karen D. Fried-
man, Director of Policy Strategies, Pension Rights Center, supra note 11; Statement of Ron
Gebhardtsbauer, Senior Pension Fellow, American Academy of Actuaries, supra, note 44.
363. Lucchetti &Francis, supra note 185.
364. S. 1838, 107th Cong. (2001).; See H.R. 3692, 107th Cong. (2002).
365. Reaction to Enron Pension Meltdown, Bill Calls for More Diversification, CNN
MONEY, Dec. 18, 2001; Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
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amount of deduction on employer stock matches in an effort to
reduce the tax deduction moral hazard. The proposal also calls for
limiting to ninety days the time an employer can force an em-
ployee to hold a matching employer stock contribution in the em-
ployee's individual account plan366 and reduces the employer's
moral hazard by urging a reduction to 50 percent from 100 percent
the tax deduction an employer can take on a matching contribu-
tion to an individual if that contribution is made in company
stock.367
Consumer groups endorse the bill368 now in committee. The
business community is alarmed, however. The manufacturers
trade group is working with lobbyists.369
Many companies are concerned that legislation could impose too
many restrictions on the way they set up and administer their
pension plans. General Electric Co., for one, says it imposes few
restrictions on investment choices for employee 401(k) plans, yet
workers still have chosen to put 75% of their 401(k) assets in GE
stock. That is because "returns have been 20% a year in the last
five years," GE spokesman David Frail says. "We'd be concerned
if, in an effort to shield employees from risk, that legislation would
go too far.
3 71
The idea should be to educate employees on the risk of under-
diversification rather than use a paternalistic approach of raw
prohibition.
PSCA's Ferrigno noted that there would likely be grassroots op-
position to telling people they cannot buy a certain amount of
company stock with Section 401(k) plan money. ERIC's Ugoretz
agreed, and recalled participant opposition to a 1996 Boxer-
sponsored bill that was very similar to her recent offering. Ugoretz
366. A Reaction to Enron Pension Meltdown, supra note 368; Ritterpusch, supra note
138.
367. A Reaction to Enron Pension Meltdown, supra note 368; Ritterpusch, supra note
138.
368. The Pension Rights Center, for instance, says it will push the bill, sponsored by
Democratic Sens. Barbara Boxer of California and Jon Corzine of New Jersey, and may
even seek stricter requirements for employers. The center is planning a grass-roots cam-
paign, teaming up retirees' and women's groups with Enron employees and International
Business Machines Corp. workers who are disgruntled about changes to their pension plan,
says Karen Friedman, the center's director of policy and communications. See: Chen, supra
note 90.




said one factor is that, for many employees, their own company's
stock is that with which they are most familiar and comfortable.3
The Senate Republicans are making additional offerings: Sena-
tor Charles Grassley, ranking member of the Committee on Fi-
nance, promises to look into whether companies should be able to
restrict participants in a plan from selling a matching contribution
received as company stock through an employee stock ownership
plan. 72 The Iowa Republican also says he is researching whether
employees should be able to sell that stock prior to an arbitrary
age set by the company - a common feature of such plans or simi-
lar 401(k) plans where company stock is contributed.3 73 Employees
should be allowed to sell company-contributed stock after ninety
days, says Robert Schuwerk, a law professor at the University of
Houston. Legislation has been introduced, too, to mandate diversi-
fication of stock in retirement plans. 74
In December, House Representative Democrat Robert Andrews,
among others, introduced the Retirement Enhancement Act of
2001... currently in subcommittee, which includes requirements
for diversification in defined contribution plan investments, the
allowance of investment advice without fiduciary entanglements,
a provision to cap at ten percent employee pension assets in em-
ployer stock and a three-year divestment rule.
At the same time, other House Democrats, Representatives Pe-
ter Deutsch and Gene Green proposed a similar bill.37' Referred to
the Committee on Ways and Means and entitled Pension Protec-
tion Act,37 7 the bill provides for revision of §401(k) to preclude as-
sets in employer's stock to exceed a 10% floor and a three-year di-
vesture of such stock post acquisition.
The bill places no caps on holdings of other types of securities,
and includes the same three-year holding period as suggested by
the president.7 ' Beyond diversification, this "next level of legisla-
tion... would mandate a statutory limit on the amount invested in
371. Ritterpusch, supra note 138. Of course, after Enron, employees are likely wiser on
this issue.
372. Scherer &Francis, supra note 172.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. H.R. 3445, 107th Cong. (2001).
376. H.R.3463, 107th Cong. (2001).
377. Id.
378. Stevenson & Labaton, supra note 350.
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corporate stock, which is more contentious from a policy stand-
point and perhaps farther than Republicans are willing to go." 79
Additional House offerings include Democratic Representative
Jackson-Lee's bill, the Pension Protection and Diversification Act
of 2002,380 which proposed to amend ERISA §407 to require a 20%
cap on employer stock to satisfy the diversification requirement
(not ESOPs) and to restrict forced employer stock holdings until
only 35 years of age. The bill also included a reduction on the
amount of deduction on employer stock matches in an effort to
reduce the tax deduction moral hazard. Democratic Representa-
tive Bill Pascrell offered the Pension Protection and Diversifica-
tion Act of 2002,81 which provides amendment to ERISA §407 to
cap employer stock at 20% employee pension assets and a 90-day
limit for restriction of divesture. Additionally, it minimizes the
moral hazard on employer tax deductions for matching stock con-
tributions by reducing the percentage on the deduction.
Critics' main concern over diversification proposals involve re-
strictions on matching with employer stock, which would have the
effect of discouraging or eliminating employer contribution to
plans."8 2 However, others rebut that this concern is illusory by
pointing out that failure to contribute to employee's plans would
necessitate not contributing to executive plans under "discrimina-
tion tests" meant to ensure equality in all retirement plans. 83
"Any bill is unlikely to force employees to sell shares purchased
with their own funds, experts say, and will instead concentrate on
company contributions."3 4
5. Investment Advice & Education
"Where retirement fund disasters have occurred, employees
have generally been found to own more company stock than neces-
sary." In other words, their uninformed practices, combined with
the limited and poor advice, creates a situation where they not
only hold the required employer contributed shares, but choose to
379. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
380. H.R. 3692, 107th Cong. (2001); See S.1838, 107th Cong. (2001).
381. H.R. 3640, 107th Cong. (2001).
382. Ellen E. Shultz & Theo Francis, Employers Say They May Cut 401(k) Rations,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3387674.
383. Id.
384. Kathy Chen, Pension Plans Are Adjusted After Enron ---Workers, Firms Shy Away




purchase an additional percentage, believing their company is the
best place to invest.388 Some investment advisors advise investors
to hold as little of their company's stock as possible or required -
since the boss already holds the future of one's job security and
career advancement. 86
While employers have been anxious to offer workers the tools to
save for their futures, there has been a hesitancy to offer invest-
ment advice.387 Under ERISA, a person who renders " investment
advice" for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to plan monies is considered a fiduciary."88 To quell this
concern, the Department of Labor issued draft guidance on De-
cember 8, 1995, in the form of an interpretative bulletin, indicat-
ing circumstances in which general participant education will not
cause the party providing the education to become a fiduciary."9
As mentioned, the provision to allow advice is the most hotly
debated in forerunning House-Republican bill. The concern was
and is the liability of providing investment guidance if that guid-
ance turns sour. Currently, only 18 percent of 423 plans surveyed
by Hewitt Associates offer investment advice and another 18 per-
cent are preparing to offer the service to their employees.
Those numbers could change dramatically if the Republican-
House forerunner or its partner the "Retirement Security Advice
Act," becomes law.39° The Retirement Security Advice Act is in
concert with the forerunner passed in the House,39' allows em-
ployers and 401(k) plan providers to offer specific advice as
long as they give full disclosure of fees and any conflicts of
interest. The bill would require qualified investment advisers to
disclose relevant information regarding fees and potential conflicts
of interest.392 "The House approved the bill by a strong 280-144
vote on November 15, 2001, 39' amid lingering Democratic concerns
385. Kadlec, supra note 98, at 27; See also: Lucchetti & Francis, supra note 185.
386. Kadlec, supra note 98, at 26; See also: Lucchetti & Francis, supra note 185 (Take
advantage and search for independent audits (like those from Moody's, Standard & Poor's,
and Value Line).
387. EnronErisa.com, Enron shockwaves will rock workers' view of employee retirement
plans, Nov. 30, 2001, available at http://www.enronerisa.com/news/newsll30001.html.
Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
388. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii).
389. Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No.22, at 2797 (Dec. 18, 1995).
390. H.R. 2269, 107th Cong. (2001).
391. Kadlec, supra note 98, at 26.
392. Michelle Singletary, Enron Fiasco may Alter Rules on Handling of 401(k) Plans,
SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS HARRISBURG, Jan. 20, 2002, at D02, available at 2002 WL 2980508.
393. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
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that participants, who may be inclined to act on any advice pro-
vided to them, would not be adequately protected by safeguards in
the bill."394 The proposed legislation would create an exemption
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to give in-
vestors greater access to the information they need to make in-
formed decisions about their retirement assets. The National As-
sociation of Manufacturers, which is leading a coalition to oppose
major pension changes, and other industry groups have voiced
support for Mr. Boehner's bill.
As stated, ERISA prohibits mutual funds, banks or insurance
companies from providing investment advice to workers in retire-
ment plans that such firms handle. Employers, however, can
make arrangements for employees to get investment advice-it
just has to come from an independent third party.9 Of course,
how does one determine the independence of that third party
which the employer arranges? "There is great potential for con-
flict of interest," says John Hotz, deputy director of the Washing-
ton-based Pension Rights Center Obviously, investment houses
support the lifting of the proscription against advice since their
"profits depend on which investment options you choose. Manag-
ers have a huge incentive to steer workers toward those funds
with high fees to maximize profits."96
The Republicans made similar offerings in the Senate where
The Retirement Security Advice Act of 2002,"' offered by Republi-
can Senator Hutchinson, would allow advice to workers.398 Con-
sumer groups disagree with the Republican approach, tout-
ing The Independent Investment Advice Act of 2001... introduced
on November 13, 2001 by Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman and
Republican Senator Susan Collins, as the better offering. The
Democratic bill would stop at exempting employers from liability
394. Id.
395. Singletary, supra note 392.
397. Steve Williamson, Who's Managing Your 401(k)?, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
June 18, 2002, at B5, available at 2002 WL 5935961.
398. S. 1978, 107th Cong. (2001).
399. Republican Senator Charles Grassley's bill, The National Employee Savings and
Trust Equity Guarantee Act, S 1971, unlike the Bush plan, the Republican House and
other Republican Senate offerings, would not allow pension-plan administrators provide
financial advice to workers. S. 1971, 107th Cong. (2002). The Retirement Security Advice
Act of 2002, S. 1978, offered by Republican Senator Hutchinson, would allow advice to
workers. S. 1978, 107th Cong. (2002).
400. S. 1677, 107th Cong. (2001).
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for specific advice and "would serve employees better."""° The
act "creates a safe harbor for retirement plan sponsors in the des-
ignation and monitoring of investment advisers for workers man-
aging their retirement income assets."40' 1 Yet, the furnishing of
advice to participants by the financial institution that administers
the plan would remain a prohibited transaction under ERISA. °'
Unlike Boehner's bill, the Democratic bill would not lift the re-
strictions on financial companies offering 401(k) participants ad-
vice on their own funds.40 3 Both bills would not hold employers li-
able for the actions of the qualified investment advisers. 44 Many
companies have opted not to provide such services to employees
because they are concerned about being sued.4 5
Still, if employers truly want to provide avenues [to] advice for
their employees, they can do that now. They can hire an inde-
pendent company to provide advice at arm's length. They can give
employees a certain amount of money each year to go out and hire
their own financial planners.46
Some portray the Boehner and Bingaman bills as rivals, while
others feel that that relationship is inappropriate given the fact
that the two are very different and portray two schools of thought
on improving the quantity and quality of investment advice. Pro-
ponents of Boehner's bill say allowing financial institutions that
administer plans to offer advice to plan participants cuts costs for
employers, yet opponents of the bill say the advisers provided by
such institutions could potentially steer the assets of often novice
investors into their own pockets. Those who advocate simply ex-
empting employers from liability, as Bingaman's bill would do, say
participants would be amply protected, though opponents say ad-
vice would still be of significant cost to employers if financial insti-
tutions are left out of the picture."'
Clearly from this discussion, legislating conduct is not
enough. Employees must pay attention to their investment
choices and understand those choices require thorough edu-
cation. Olivia Mitchell, professor of insurance and risk manage-
401. Singletary, supra note 392.
402. Id.
403. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
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ment at the Wharton School of Business said she would like to see
more discussion on alternative approaches outside of a simple cap
on employer stock. She said the broader question raised by the
situation is the need for more investor education and financial
literature to afford participants a better understanding of concepts
like risk and return and the power of compounding."8
6. Additional Senate Offerings
Senator Wellstone presented the Retirement Security Protection
Act of 2002409 which provides for a 20% cap on employer stock
holdings (excludes, obviously ESOPs), a release of requirement for
investment in employer stock as matching contribution, a 30 day
notice prior to and a limit on lockdowns to 10 days, prohibition of
executive trading of employer stock during such lockdown, and
most importantly, monetary relief - including punitive damages -
for violations of ERISA.
Senator Hutchinson introduced the Pension Plan Protection
Act410 in February. Her bill provides for a release of requirement
for investment in employer stock as matching contribution and
allowance after 100 days of divesture of any employer stock. It
also includes a requirement that the plan trustee provide notice
and education regarding diversification if employee's assets are
25% or more in employer stock, amendment to IRC §4975 and
ERISA to allow for certain investment advice from a fiduciary, a
30 day notice prior to a lockdown under IRC §401(a) and ERISA
§404(a), exception to protection from fiduciary responsibility in
employee directed plans during lockout periods, and prohibition to
executive trading of employer stock during such lockdown. The
Pension Security Act of 2002,41 which Senator Hutchinson offered
in February, would amend ERISA and the IRC to restrict invest-
ment in employer securities and allow investment advice, as well
as amend the Securities Exchange Act to prohibit any insider
trading during lockout-like periods.
Senator Durbin's "Investor-Employees Need Financial Facts
and Options for Responsible Retirement Plan Management Act of
2002" or the "INFORM Act of 2002' 41" provides for improved dis-
409. Id.
410. S. 1919, 107th Cong. (2002).
411. S. 1921, 107th Cong. (2002).
412. S. 1969, 107th Cong. (2002).
413. S. 2032, 107th Cong. (2002).
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closure, diversification, account access, and accountability under
individual account plans by requiring a 60-day lockdown notice
with a restricted 10-day lockdown window and employer liability
for plan losses during the lockdown. The bill also provides an ex-
pansion of the equitable remedies for fiduciary breach to "such
additional relief as a court of equity might have awarded in a case
involving the enforcement or administration of a trust." Another
interesting addition to the rank and file includes provision for a
new Department of Labor office entitled "Office of Pension Par-
ticipant Advocacy" responsible for researching, evaluating and
making recommendations about private pension system.
Senator Cleland's bill, 4 provides strictly for education to inves-
tors while Senator Kerry's bill 'Worker Investment and Retire-
ment Education Act of 2002' or the 'WIRE Act'4 4 provides not only
for education but new diversification rights and limitation on
blackout periods. Senator Kerry's bill includes a provision for in-
dependent non-fiduciary investment advisor and requires the
choice of no employer stock participation (with ESOP exception),
although it does require holding certain employer securities for
seven years - or until age fifty-five.
7. Additional House Offerings
The Retirement Opportunity Expansion Act of 2001,"' which
Representative Coyne offered in December 2001, is reported to
aim at amending the IRC protections. The Retirement Account
Protection Act of 2001,46 introduced by Representative Bentsen, is
"to amend ERISA to provide additional fiduciary protections for
participants and beneficiaries under employee stock ownership
plans with respect to lockdowns placed on plan assets." 7 Repre-
sentative Bentsen also introduced the Employee Savings Protec-
tion Act of 2002418 which will "prohibit knowing misrepresenta-
tions by fiduciaries of 401(k) plans which may induce participants
and beneficiaries to act contrary to their own best interest in con-
trolling the assets in their own accounts, and to amend title 11 of
the United States Code to protect claims based on such misrepre-
414. S. 2185, 107th Cong. (2002).
415. S. 2190, 107th Cong. (2002).
416. H.R. 3488, 107th Cong. (2001).
417. H.R. 3509, 107th Cong. (2001).
418. Id.
419. H.R. 3623, 107th Cong. (2002); See also: Fiduciary Responsibility, supra note 336.
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sentations."19 Under the Act, fiduciaries that engage in such mis-
representations would not be covered under the ERISA
§(404)(c)(2)(B) provision that exempts fiduciaries from financial
liability for any loss resulting from a participant or beneficiary's
exercise of control.42' The bill would create new protection in
bankruptcy for employee claims arising from breaches of fiduciary
duty based on misrepresentations, giving such claims "priority"
status over unsecured creditors.42' Another important reform
would be to prevent companies from setting restrictions on when
and how much company stock employees can sell from their re-
tirement plans. In Enron's case, employees could not sell until
they were fifty.
422
The House Ways and Means Committee ranking Democrat
Charles Rangel formally introduced legislation423 that would ex-
tend the golden parachute42' excise tax to sales of corporate stock
by corporate insiders during periods when rank-and-file employ-
ees of the company are subject to lockouts.
Representative David Bonior's 401(k) Pension Right to Know
Act of 2002425 requires amendment to ERISA for both educational
and notice requirements for investors while the Employee Pension
Freedom Act of 2002,426 introduced by Representative Miller and a
list of others, imposes diversification and disclosure requirements.
The Miller bill is similar to the Boxer-Corzine proposal, where
workers vested in a retirement plan would be entitled to diversify
their employer contributions and would not be forced to hold em-
ployer stock.427 Employers would be required to provide adequate
notice to employees before access to funds could be locked down,
and lockdowns would be limited to no more than ten business
days.428
420. Fiduciary Responsibility, supra note 336.
421. Id.
422. Id.
422. Emergency Worker and Investor Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 3622, 107th Cong.
(2002). Id.
423. H.R. 3622, 107th Cong. (2002).
424. Golden parachute payment is "an employment-contract provision that grants an
upper-level executive lucrative severance benefits - including long-term salary guarantees
or bonuses - if control of the company changes hands." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 712 (7th
ed. 1999).
425. H.R. 3642, 107th Cong. (2002).
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In February, Representative English introduced Safeguarding
America's Retirement Act of 2002429 to the House. The bill will
amend the IRC and ERISA to disallow protection from fiduciary
duties to employers in Enron-like situations - like a lockdown and
provide for criminal and civil penalties under ERISA.43 °
Representative Miller's bill, Inside Stock Sales Employee Notifi-
cation Act of 2002,43' specifically aims at amending ERISA "to pro-
vide for timely notification of plan participants and beneficiaries
whose individual accounts hold employer securities of insider trad-
ing in employer securities.
8. Stalled
Experts seriously doubt Congress will pass any serious reform
before November, since both Republicans and Democrats are
likely to use the issue as campaign platforms at that time.432
Smith, the Pittsburgh-based consultant, said that the deadlock
is rooted in the Senate's skepticism over Boehner's provision that
would relax current restrictions on fund companies from providing
investment advice to 401(k) investors. Some, including the AARP,
based in Washington D.C., have opposed that provision because
they say it would allow fund companies to steer investors toward
funds that yield higher fees.433
American Society of Pension Actuaries Executive Director Brian
Graff said, "For pension legislation to pass, it has to be biparti-
san.'034  Republican offerings, which business, especially the
manufacturers, support, allow limits to diversification but not di-
versification requirements. The business-friendly bills also allow
investment advice, generally, without the risk of exposure to fidu-
ciary liability. Consumers find the Democratic offerings more pal-
atable since they offer strict diversification requirements - a legis-
lative protection basically making education unnecessary since
431. H.R. 3657, 107th Cong. (2002).
432. Neikirk, supra note 343. Reform bill resurgence is expected. (Patrick Basham,
senior fellow at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank, said he doubted serious reform
legislation will be passed by Congress this year. Republicans and Democrats are using the
issue to play to their political bases with an eye to the November elections, he said.)
House Passes Bush's 401(k) Reform BillManaging 401(k) Plans, June 1, 2002, available at
2002 WL 7369741; Tony Lystra,401(k) Reform Legislation Deadlocked, MuT. FUND MKT.
NEWS, June 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8009102.
433. Lystra, supra note 434.
434. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
435. See Testimony of Elaine L. Chao, supra note 352.
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investors will be precluded from making Enron-like, all-eggs-in-
one-basket mistakes.
Republicans and President Bush obviously favor allowing em-
ployee investors the most freedom to invest, with little diversifica-
tion requirements, while insisting upon education to allow in-
formed choices.435 Democrats may be more realistic and agree with
other experts who realize that educating the average American
employee about investments is an uphill battle, to say the least.
Some experts call for the simplification of plans themselves - not
just more confusing information piled on what is already too com-
plex for the average person."6 Ideally, any proposal will offer di-
versification cap recommendations with the ability for immediate
divesture, backed by limitations on tax deductions for employer
stock contributions to limit the moral hazard to employers.
As to the education component of the proffered advice: Educa-
tion is priceless, but must begin far sooner than in an employee's
prospectus at hiring. Financial education must begin in grammar
school and continue through the upper grades so even the least
educated American can understand the risks and benefits to in-
vestment. Education at this point is too little too late. Today's
employees need more protection from the wolves managing their
money - maybe tomorrow's employees will be more informed and
be able to spot wolves from the sheep.
Additionally, exposing employers to serious risk under the fidu-
ciary provisions - even with 404(c) protections - is too harsh a
duty to proscribe. What legislation would require is an employer -
who has no or little control for what the under-educated employee
might decide to do - to be responsible for what, effectively, it did
not cause. That pushes liability too far over towards legislating
morality and forcing employers to baby-sit employees finances.
VI. CONCLUSION
According to Ugoretz, people need some space between the time
hearings are held and when the Enron collapse took place. The
more time people have to consider facts of not only of what hap-
436. Pension and Retirement Issues in Enron Collapse: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pension, 107th Cong (2002) (testimony of Alicia H.
Munnell, Boston College's Carroll School of Management), available at 2002 WL 2010342




pened in Enron, but also what's going on in other companies and
other plans, the more rational the discussion will be. There is
room for a more rational and reasonable discussion.437
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned lawmakers to proceed
with caution in considering sweeping new mandates on employer-
sponsored tax code Section 401(k) plans. The chamber expressed
concern about over-regulation and restrictions on investment op-
tions resulting in fewer employers offering Section 401(k) plans,
employee stock ownership plans, and other retirement benefits.
3
1
"Congress needs to gather all the facts first," Thomas Donohue,
chamber president and CEO, said in a news release. "Acting
swiftly for the sake of appearing engaged may be good politics, but
it's bad policy.
439
The Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (PSCA) is vehe-
mently lobbying against what it deems rash legislation, noting the
popularity and success of defined-contribution plans, the ability to
invest in employer-stock as an essential characteristic of such
plans, and the general freedom employee investors enjoy with
such plans as reason to take slow and careful any legislation."'
According to the Chamber of Commerce news release, employers
voluntarily provide retirement benefits to 90 million U.S. workers
over and above their Social Security contributions. By rushing to
pile more mandates on employers in the name of protecting em-
ployees, Congress risks making the system more complicated,
more expensive, and less available, it warned.44'
The Coalition of Employee Retirement Benefits, in concert with
over 500 companies and organizations, urged Congress to take it
slowly.442
American Benefits Council Vice President for Retirement Policy
James Delaplane said Bush's directive cast the net very widely,
stopping short of any prejudgment of where the review should go.
He said that while participant disclosure, education, and advice
may be scrutinized as part of the review, a comprehensive review
437. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
438. Fiduciary Responsibility, supra note 336.
439. Id.
440. See http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usmulgrew62702aff.pdf.
441. Fiduciary Responsibility, supra note 336.
442. Major Business Associations Urge Restraint on Enron Legislation, PSCA Letter to
Congress, Jan. 25, 2002, available at,
http://www.psca.org/wasldjan252002enronletter.html.
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of laws governing Section 401(k) plans is unlikely given the enor-
mous success of the plans.443
Yet, quick and decisive action may be exactly the cure since the
debacle the Enron employees now suffer will not be a thing of the
past if the status quo remains. The lack of stock diversification
and heavy employer stock investment is not unusual and is more
widespread than one would care to believe.444 Although employers
are embracing the "diversification message" and attempting to
make positive changes in plans or educate employees, not every
employee is so protected.445
The Federal government took a long and careful pause before
choosing to regulate the private pension system after Studebaker.
Taking too long to correct gaps in the protective legislation now is
just as severe a breach of duty as lifting a drowning man from the
water only to drop him back in again. Congress must act as it now
has an affirmative - even common law - duty to continue to do
SO.
446
443. Ritterpusch, supra note 138.
444. Chen, supra note 387.
445. Id.
446. One must pause to ask why does the Federal government choose to walk this
paternalistic path? Cannot legislators choose to criminalize Enron accounting and fraudu-
lent reporting activities as enough protection and leave the investment determination to
the employees? Providing for adequate investment education could be enough, in the long
run. Education critics often point to the dearth of economics, banking, finance and account-
ing courses in the public school system. Is this not the true source of the problem?
Like states with contributory negligence statutes, why do the pension protectors not adopt
such a view of causation? "Victims" of the Enron and other such pension disasters cannot
stand to the side of the crash, pointing at the drivers of the other vehicles and deflecting
the responsibility for the damage they helped cause by failing to have their breaks exam-
ined. The investors must take responsibility. See: Kadlec, supra note 98, at 27. See for
investment advice to pension holders: Lucchetti & Francis, supra note 185; Brigid McMen-
amin, In Myself I Trust; Coaxing out your inner financial planner, FORBES, June 10, 2002,






Employees and others invested heavily in Enron Stock
2001:
Feb. 5: In a meeting and subsequent e-mail, some senior Ander-
sen officials discuss dropping Enron as a client.
Feb. 12: Jeffrey Skilling becomes Enron's CEO. Kenneth Lay
stays as chairman
May: Vice-Chair Clifford Baxter complains of the "inappropri-
ateness" of Enron's partnership deals, one of three executives to do
so. He later resigns.
June: Enron announces high third quarter earnings. Stock av-
erages $44.
August: Stock hit all-time high of $ 90.
Aug. 14: Jeff Skilling, who served as CEO for six months,
abruptly steps down for personal reasons. Ken Lay assumes the
role of CEO. Enron's stock closes at $42.93, off from a 52-week
high of around $85. As Enron's Broadband division reports losses
of $137 million, Lay tries to calm investors. Unappeased, analysts
lower Enron's rating.
Aug. 15: Enron vice president Sherron Watkins anonymously
sends a brief letter to Lay, warning him that Skilling's sudden
departure could "raise suspicions of accounting improprieties."
Lay receives Watkins' warning letter.
Aug. 20-21: Lay sells 93,000 shares, earns $2 million. Four An-
dersen officials, including lead partner David Duncan, meet to
discuss Watkins' concerns. Through August 2001, Lay cashes out
$16.1 million in stock. Skilling gets $15.5 million from selling his
shares.
Sept. 26: Stock drops to $25 Lay urges employees to buy stock
and reassures Enron employees that "our financial liquidity has
never been stronger."
October: Begins a period where even selling was impossible.
For three weeks, starting in late October, the company's 401(k)
447. Enron Erisa.com.; Duffy, et.al., supra note 152; See also: Wall Street Journal On-
line, Chronology of Enron's Recent Woes, Feb. 22, 2002, available at
http://www.platts.com/features/enron/timeline.shtml.
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plan was frozen while it changed plan administrators. Company
officials say the change had been in the works for over a year and
could not be postponed. During the freeze, Enron's stock went
from $15 a share to $9 a share. Washington, DC, attorney Eli Got-
tesdiener has also filed a class-action suit on behalf of Enron em-
ployees. Andersen ordered the destruction of documents.
Oct. 15: As a result of the Watkins letter, Enron commissions a
report from law firm Vinson & Elkins. The firm, incidentally, as-
sisted in formation of the retile partnerships. Vinson & Elkins is-
sued a nine-page report stating that Andersen approved of the
Condor and Raptor deals and that Enron had done nothing wrong.
MID-OCTOBER: A White House study, led by top economic ad-
viser and former Enron consultant Lawrence Lindsey, looks at the
possible economic consequences of an Enron failure.
Oct. 16: Enron reports a $638 million third-quarter loss and dis-
closes a $1.2 billion reduction in shareholder equity, partly related
to losses by partnerships run by Chief Financial Officer Andrew
Fastow.
Oct. 22: Enron acknowledges Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion inquiry into a possible conflict of interest related to the com-
pany's dealings with those partnerships.
Oct. 23: Lay reassures investors in a conference call. Andersen's
Duncan calls an urgent meeting to step up disposal of Enron
documents. Anderson accelerates disposal.
Oct. 24: Andrew Fastow is replaced as chief financial officer by
Jeff McMahon.
Oct. 25: Enron draws on $1 billion credit line
Oct. 31: The Securities and Exchange Commission announces it
has begun a formal investigation, allowing it to subpoena evi-
dence.. Enron adds William Powers Jr., dean of the University of
Texas School of Law, to the board to chair a special committee
dealing with the investigation. US Security & Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) opened a formal investigation into Enron's transac-
tions. Enron said it had formed a committee to carry out its own
investigation.
LATE OCTOBER-EARLY NOVEMBER: Lay phones various
Administration officials to warn of Enron's dire straits. Treasury
officials conclude Enron's collapse won't hurt markets. Lindsey's
White House study concurs.
Nov. 6: Enron's stock price drops below $10 a share after re-




Nov. 8: Enron revises its financial statements for the past five
years to account for $586 million in losses. The losses are related
to a number of complex partnerships, including several under in-
vestigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Ander-
sen receives a subpoena from the SEC. Enron admits inflating
income almost $600 million since 1997.
Signs that Enron was withdrawing from its market-making ac-
tivities in the gas and power markets became clearly visible as the
company posted significantly fewer bids and offers on En-
ronOnline (EOL), the company's online trading platform. Trading
also shifted from EOL to IntercontinentalExchange (ICE), whose
online trading system was "indeed experiencing increased volumes
this week," a spokeswoman said.
Nov. 9: Dynegy announces an agreement to buy its much-larger
cross-town rival for more than $8 billion in stock. It promises in-
vestments to stabilize Enron. Duncan's assistant e-mails other
secretaries to "stop the shredding."
Enron-Dynegy unveiled their $7.8-billion merger agreement late
Nov 9, forming a new company, Dynegy Corp, in which Dynegy
would own 64% and Enron 36%. According to the deal Dynegy
would exchange 0.2685 of a Dynegy share for each share of Enron.
Chairman and CEO of Dynegy, Chuck Watson, would retain his
position in the new company.
Nov. 10: S&P lowered its long-term credit rating on Enron from
BBB to BBB-, while it placed Dynegy on credit watch following the
announcement of a pending merger with Enron.
Nov. 13: The first class action 401(k) suit was filed by plaintiff
Pamela Tittle, a participant in the 401(k) plan. The suit alleges
that the trustees of the Enron 401(k) plan violated their fiduciary
duties by not informing plan participants that the company stock
was in peril. The suit was filed by the Houston law firm of Camp-
bell, Harrison & Dagley LLP, the Seattle law firm of Keller Rohr-
back LLP and the Phoenix law firm of Dalton Gotto Samson &
Kilgard PLC.
Nov. 14: After criticism by employees, Lay says he will not take
a $61 million severance payment he would be due if the merger
closes. Enron says it planned sell business units valued around $8
billion over the next year.
Nov. 20: Shares drop 23 percent to $6.99 after news the com-
pany had to restate its third-quarter earnings and would need to
pay off or renegotiate a $690 million debt after stock was down-
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graded on Nov. 12. Officials from both Enron and Dynegy say the
merger is not in trouble.
Nov. 21: Enron reaches critical agreement to extend the $690
million debt obligation.
Nov. 23: The Wall Street Journal reports two lawsuits by Enron
employees claiming "trustees breached their fiduciary duties by
continuing to offer company stock, even after they became aware
of serious business problems that would hurt the stock price" and
seeking class action certification. One suit asserts failure to warn
and misrepresentation of financial statements.
Nov. 28: Dynergy pulls out of deal to buy Enron, citing
"breaches of representations" by Enron and exercises its option to
buy Enron's 16,500 mile-long Northern Natural Gas pipeline.
Dynergy announced it had terminated merger talks with Enron
claiming Enron's "breaches of representations, warranties, cove-
nants and agreements in the merger agreement, including the ma-
terial adverse change provision" as reasons for calling off the deal.
Trading in Enron shares were halted for a short while as they fell
below $3. S&P downgraded Enron to a single B-minus. Enron's
debt is downgraded to junk status, leading to a temporary halt in
the company's EnronOnline platform, which handles about 60 per-
cent of its trading business or $2.8 billion daily.
Enron's shares plunge to below $1 amid the heaviest single-day
trading volume ever for a New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq-
listed stock.
Nov. 29: Dynergy CEO Chuck Watson announced that the deal
was off. Enron stops sending cash to its overseas operations, forc-
ing its Enron Europe operations to file for creditor protection and
lay off 1,100 employees.
The New Power Co., an Enron Corp. spin-off entering the de-
regulated Texas electric market, reminds consumers it is an "in-
dependent and separately held company from Enron" with its own
board, financial resources and management team.
A congressional panel launches an investigation into Enron's
business practices.
Nov. 30: Stock falls to 26 cents. Enron announced almost all of
its 1,400 employees at its European head office in London were
being made laid-off. A small number of staff were asked to stay to
wind things up together with the administrators for its European
operations, PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
Dec. 2: Enron files for bankruptcy protection, the largest in
U.S. history. Enron sues Dynegy for terminating the planned
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merger, seeking damages of at least $10 billion. The suit asks the
court to block Dynegy from taking possession of the Northern
Natural Gas pipeline.
Dec. 3: Dynegy countersued Enron over the right to acquire the
pipeline.
Enron starts cutting 6,000 employees in Houston and elsewhere.
The company arranges up to $1.5 billion of debtor-in-possession
financing.
The 401(k) retirement savings plan at Enron had assets of $2.1
billion at the end of 2000. According to documents filed with gov-
ernment regulators, 62 percent of those assets were invested in
the stock of the energy trading company.
Enron announced the redundancy of 4,000 employees, most of
them from the company's Houston office. The company announced
Nov 30 redundancies in both its European and Asian operations.
Dec. 6: An employee revealed all of Enron India's 200 staff ear-
lier in the week had received their termination notices and that
Dec 7 was their last day as Enron employees.
Dec. 10: Enron made its first lay-offs in its core power and gas
trading operations at its Houston, Texas office, a spokesperson
confirmed. Two hundred people, including traders, back-office and
support personnel were let go.
Dec. 11: Enron Japan and its three subsidiaries -- Enron Japan
Marketing, Enron Japan Funding, and E Power Holdings -- filed
for bankruptcy in Tokyo in accordance with the Japanese bank-
ruptcy law. The court will open a trial to investigate if the case
meets the country's guidelines for bankruptcy.
2002
January: Enron stock closed at 36 cents. That means that
stock worth $ 1 million in August 2000 was worth $ 4,000.
Jan. 9: The US Department of Justice opened a criminal inves-
tigation into Enron's collapse. The Justice Department late Jan 9
formed a task force which included prosecutors from Houston,
New York and San Francisco.
Jan. 10: Andersen admits destroying documents.
Jan. 14: U.S. Internal Revenue Service opened its own investi-
gation of Enron, senior government investigators said. The tax
service could bring civil or criminal charges if it found that En-
ron's accounting snafus was reflected in its tax returns
Jan. 15: Enron suspended from New York Stock Exchange.
Andersen fires Duncan for shredding documents. N.Y.S.E. takes
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Enron off the board, saying "the company's securities are no
longer suitable for trading on the N.Y.S.E."
Jan. 16: Duncan tells congressional investigators that Andersen
officials talked about Enron last February and says he was aware
that the account posed a "significant risk."
Jan. 17: White House reveals it conducted a review of Enron's
troubles in mid-October. Enron fires Andersen.
Jan. 18: White House confirms that Vice President Cheney met
in June with a politician from India about an Enron project.
Jan. 25: The Severed Enron Employees Coalition, a coalition of
more than 400 current and former Enron employees, filed a class
action suit in a bid to recoup "staggering" losses suffered by par-
ticipants in the bankrupt company's 401k retirement plan. The
coalition named Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, Andrew Fastow,
Arthur Andersen and Northern Trust Co, the trustee of the 401k
plan, as defendants.
Feb. 4: President Bush's proposals to change pension rules
drew fire from consumer and business groups, but some lawmak-
ers began using his ideas as a blueprint for their own plans.
Feb. 6: A top Enron human-resources executive who also served
as a trustee of the company's 401(k) plan said she became aware
of serious allegations about the company's financial practices in
August, but did nothing to protect retirement-plan members. Ms.
Olson testified that the plan trustees felt that they didn't have the
ability to change the plan design without approval from the board
of directors.
Feb. 7: Some current and former employees of Enron's retail
energy unit say the company asked them to pose as busy electric-
ity and natural-gas sales representatives one day in 1998 so the
unit could impress Wall Street analysts visiting its Houston head-
quarters.
Labor Secretary Elaine Chao pushed President Bush's proposal
to give workers greater flexibility to diversify retirement savings,
but warned Congress against setting "arbitrary limits" on the
amount of employer-company stock that could be held in 401(k)
plans.
Enron's bankruptcy may have wiped out most of the retirement
savings of most of its workers. But one thing it didn't take away
were the pensions of its most senior executives. Financial filings
disclose that former Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay, for one, used
a private partnership to protect millions of dollars worth of execu-
tive pension benefits.
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Feb. 8: The top trustee of Enron's 401(k) plan sold nearly $1
million in company stock in June, but said he didn't violate his
fiduciary duties by leaving the company's stock on a list of invest-
ment choices for employees.
Feb. 11: The US Labor Department said it wants to oust Enron
officials overseeing the company's retirement plans and replace
them with independent trustees. The government would go to
court if necessary to force out the administrative committee over-
seeing the plan, the agency said.
Feb. 13: The Labor Department reached an agreement with
Enron to replace the trustees of its three pension plans with an
independent oversight group, after thousands of plan participants
lost their holdings in the wake of the company's collapse.
Feb. 19: Scoring a first-round victory in court, Enron employees
are allowed to form their own creditors' committee to represent
their interests in the energy-trading company's bankruptcy-court
proceedings.
Feb. 27: Pension Laws After Enron, Wall St. Journal Online
Committee-Full Committee: David Walker-comptroller general,
GAO; William Sweetnam, Jr.-benefits tax counsel, Treasury Dept;
Steven Kandarian-executive director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp.; Jack Van Derhei-research director, Employee Benefit Re-
search Institute; Bradford Huss-Trucker Huss, San Francisco.
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APPENDIX 2: ENRON SHARES GRAPHIC HISTORY
Source: Platt's Global Energy:
http://www.platts.com/features/enron/timeline.shtml
Enron share priceweekly close
Week of Nov 6, 2000- Week of Feb 11, 2002
(Note: Enron has been delisted from NYSE wef Jan 15. 2002, and is currently traded as OTC:ENRNQ}
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APPENDIX 3: 401(K) ASSETS
Source: Wall Street Journal Online:
Aaron Lucchetti & Theo Francis, Diversification Becomes the
Vogue After Tech Bubble, Enron Collapse, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
2002.
DESPITE MANY OPTIONS NOT MANYDIVERSIF
Most 401(k) plans offer muftlplo Investmedt opUons...
Percentage of 401(k) plans offering each number of investment optons
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*Less Man 1% of 401(k) PIMs
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Most investors tend to oncentrate their funds in fewer investments
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Sorc He wtw Aasocafs 2001 sumay or 428 enwky*M
Enron: Final Straw and Pensions of Brick
APPENDiX 4: COMPANIES WITH HIGH PERCENTAGES OF PLAN
ASSETS IN COMPANY STOCK
NOTE: "Several companies
recently eased restrictions
on selling company stock in
401(k) plans, though some
say they had nothing to do,
with Enron. They include
International Paper, Mellon
Financial and Gannett,
which owns USA TODAY."
LOTS OF COMPANY STOCK
Percent of total assets In company stock
in defined-contribution plans*
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APPENDIX 5: PAYMENTS TO EXECUTIVES FOR STOCK PRICE
Big Payments
The following is a It of Enron
executives aM the bonuses and
other payments they recelved In
2001. Many were for hitting profit
and stock price targets during a
period when, investigators say. the
company Inflated profits. O ly
amounts over ,60.000 are shown.
CHECK OATE
NAMW AMOUNT towl)
Kenneth L $3,600,000 Jan. 11
Lay 7.000.000 Feb. 5
Jeffrey K. 1,920,000 Jan. 1I
Skiilng 6,600.000 Feb. 5
Kenneth 1.750,000 Feb. 5
RIce 1.487.500 Feb. 5
262.500 Feb. S
1,617,011 Feb. 7-
Jeffrey 1,100.000 Feb. 5
4cMahon 694,862 Feb. 6
1,500,000 Nov. 29
John Clifford 200,000 Jan. 11
Baxter 1.200,000 Feb. 5
1,386.055 Feb. 7*
Andrew S. 350.000 Jan. 11
Fastow 1,300.000 Feb. 5
1,386,055 Feb. 7-
Richard A. 350.000 Jan. 11
Causey 1,000,000 Feb. 5
200,000 Feb. 5
Michael J. 800,000 Feb. 5
Kopper 602.671 Feb. 6
905,000 Aug. 10
Richard . 75,000 Jan. 11
Buy 900,000 Feb. 5
694,862 Feb. 7-
Mark 175,000 Jan. IV




James V. 484,000 Jan. 11'
Derick Jr. 800.000 Feb. 5-
Ben F. 600,000 Feb. 5
GOsan Jr. 69,223 Feb. 6
'Oocuments show that another check
was issued in thle same amounf en the
same aay. Eron execut0veas said that
such muW appearances indc.atod
separate checks were issued, bt
because that could not be confirmed.
only one chock Is lsted hue.
